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With the annexation of Crimea in the spring of 2014, the topic of the Finnish model 
reemerged in the area of International Relations. Notable experts in the area of 
International Relations, such as Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger, have 
recommended finlandization as a possible solution for Ukraine in its current conflict. 
This thesis aims to examine how Finnish experts relate to the Finnish model and its 
recommendation for other countries, such as Ukraine.  
 
Interviews were conducted with Finnish experts in history and foreign policy. This 
thesis used these interviews to first determine what kind of an epistemic community 
exists in Finnish foreign policy. Having determined this, this thesis then analyzed the 
narratives of the interviewees using the method of narrative analysis to discover how 
the interviewees narrated the topic of the Finnish model and its applicability outside 
of Finland.  
 
The analysis of the interviews showed that a strong epistemic community in Finnish 
foreign policy exists. Furthermore, the data revealed that the narratives used by the 
interviewees varied only slightly when discussing the Finnish model. When 
discussing the Finnish model as a possible solution for other countries, the variations 
in the narratives increased, though, the final results showed that there was a certain 
amount of consensus, even amongst the diverging narrative groups.  
 
This thesis concluded that an overarching narrative has emerged among the 
representatives of the epistemic community interviewed in this work. The narrative 
was supportive of the Finnish model for Finland during the Cold War. The narratives 
that emerged on the question of whether or not the Finnish model would be a solution 
for others revealed that the legacy of the Finnish model was not as uniform. However, 
even though the various narratives that emerged contradicted one another, the final 
consensus of the interviewees was that no country existing today would be able to 
find the Finnish model as a solution for themselves.  
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Overview 
 
Three years after the start of the Euromaidan revolution, Ukraine has an 
association agreement with the EU, but it is also embroiled in a war in its eastern 
provinces, which Russia has aided, after first having annexed the Crimean peninsula.  
Due to the conflict in Ukraine, the discussion on the Finnish model has 
regained prominence. Neutrality for Ukraine through finlandization has been 
suggested by a few notable political scientists (such as Zbigniew Brzezinski, 2014). 
However, some Finns have reacted negatively to the idea that finlandization is a 
policy that Ukraine should be encouraged to take (Taubert, 2014; Nyberg, 2014). Due 
to the recent reemergence of the idea of the Finnish model, there is very little relevant, 
modern literature, especially as regards the idea of applying the Finnish model to 
Ukraine or any other country, with the exception of East Asia.  
Over the course of the last decade relations between China and Taiwan have 
warmed in what is called the “second détente” (Gilley, 2010). In a much referenced 
article in Foreign Affairs, Gilley argued that Taiwan is on the path of finlandization. 
He contends that this path is in the best interest of Taiwan, China and the United 
States (Taiwan’s current primary benefactor), and that the Finnish model will lead to 
the democratization of China and peace in East Asia. (Gilley, 2010.) However, just as 
Finns critiqued the ‘outsider’ understanding of the Finnish model expressed by 
Brzezinski, so another Finn, Jyrki Kallio, of the Finnish Institute of International 
Affairs, delivered a strong rebuke of Gilley’s understanding of the Finnish model 
(Kallio, 2010). 
This term ‘finlandization’, although used as a possible solution for some 
countries (as Brzezinski and Gilley have done), has a negative meaning for some in 
post-Cold War Finland. Since the Cold War, experts inside of Finland have come to 
accept the belief that Finland had subjugated itself to the Soviet Union and had been 
complicit in the Soviet Union’s efforts to use Finland (Browning, 2002, 53-54). On 
the other hand, there is the term ‘Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line’. The Paasikivi-Kekkonen 
Line was the name given to the Finnish Cold War foreign policy. According to Max 
Jakobson, the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line was about convincing “the Soviet leadership 
of Finland’s loyalty in terms of defense, while maintaining its democracy and 
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developing its economic relations with the West” (Jakobson, 2006, 49). Together 
these two terms fit under the wider umbrella of the Finnish model. Simply defined, 
the Finnish model is a model for how a small state relates to a bigger neighbor. This 
thesis will use the term Finnish model, as it is more wholesome and inclusive when 
discussing the topic of Finnish foreign policy. 
When considering the Finnish model in this research, this thesis theorizes that 
an epistemic community of foreign policy experts exists in post-Cold War Finland. 
An epistemic community is a group of experts who can come together to influence 
policy outcomes for the betterment of society as a whole without any goals of 
personal enrichment in any form (Haas, 1992, 3; Cross, 2013, 142). This thesis will 
analyze the narratives created by representatives of the epistemic community 
collected through interviews. The interviews for this thesis sought to discover what 
kind of an epistemic community exists, meaning: is the epistemic community strong, 
weak, or something in between? The interviews also looked to determine how the 
representatives of the epistemic community narrated the Finnish model and how they 
narrated the model as a solution for others.  
 
1.2 Hypothesis and Research Questions 
 
 This thesis hypothesizes that an epistemic community of Finnish foreign 
policy experts has formed in post-Cold War Finland. This thesis will test this 
epistemic community to determine how strong it is, and then discover how the 
representatives of the epistemic community view the topic of the Finnish model.  
To this extent, this thesis attempts to answer three main questions: 
1. What kind of an epistemic community of foreign policy experts exists 
in post-Cold War Finland? 
2. How do the members of the epistemic community relate to the Finnish 
model? What does the epistemic community say? How do they narrate 
the Finnish model?  
3. Would they or would they not recommend this model to other 
countries?  
To answer these questions, this thesis has been divided into the following 
chapters: Introduction, Background & History, Literature Review on the Theory of 
Epistemic Communities, Methods and Data Collection, Data Analysis, and 
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Conclusion. Chapter two will introduce the reader to the history of the Finnish model 
and its various interpretations. Chapter three will familiarize the reader with the 
theory of epistemic communities, which is the guiding theory of this thesis. Chapter 
four outlines the methods for data collection and data analysis in this theory, as well 
as describing the concerns and issues that appeared over the course of writing this 
thesis. The data analysis has been divided into two chapters; chapters five and six. 
Chapter five analyzes the data from the interviews in order to determine what kind of 
epistemic community exists. Chapter six analyzes the data to determine what 
narratives have arisen from the members of the epistemic community on the topic of 
the Finnish model. Finally, the conclusion summarizes the results of this thesis.  
 
1.3 Data and Method 
 
The data for this thesis was collected by conducting interviews with Finnish 
experts in foreign policy, both from the University of Tampere in Tampere, Finland 
and the Finnish Institute of International Affairs in Helsinki, Finland. Overall eight 
interviews were scheduled and conducted over the time period of April 2016 to June 
2016. Several of the interviewees expressed a desire to remain anonymous; therefore, 
the interviewees have each been assigned a letter (i.e. Interviewee A) to represent 
them. This research will be qualitative, and as such, the quality rather than the 
quantity of the interviews will be the priority. 
This research will adopt the method of Narrative Analysis in order to 
determine what kind of narratives the epistemic community has created when 
discussing the Finnish model. More precisely this thesis will utilize Polkinghorne’s 
paradigmatic analysis of narratives approach, meaning that this research will not 
analyze events to construct a narrative, but rather the narratives constructed by the 
interviewees will be analyzed (Polkinghorne, 1995, 12-13). Analyzing these 
narratives will reveal if divisions exist in the epistemic community when discussing 
the topic of the Finnish model, and what kind of divisions exist (i.e. between older 
and younger members or male and female members).  
Chapter four will give further consideration to the methods utilized in this 
thesis. 
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1.4 Research Gap 
 
 The subject of the Finnish model was chosen, because there appears to be a 
gap in the research when discussing the Finnish model today. As mentioned above, 
the Finnish model has reemerged in recent years in discussions in International 
Relations as a solution for Ukraine (Zbigniew Brzezinski, 2014, Taubert, 2014; 
Nyberg, 2014).  
 Although the model has been discussed in the media, little research has been 
done on the Finnish model’s applicability to today. Moreover, little and less has been 
done to determine how Finns view the model as a practical solution for other 
countries in harsh geopolitical climates similar to the one in which Cold War Finland 
found itself.  
 By seeking to understand what kind of a Finnish foreign policy epistemic 
community exists and analyzing its narratives regarding the Finnish model, this thesis 
can hope to close the current research gap.  
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2. History and Background 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 This section of the thesis will review the history and background of the 
Finnish model by looking at a couple of narratives that have emerged.  
Born at the end of World War Two, Finland’s post-war foreign policy was 
created to defend its independence at a time of great uncertainty. With the emergence 
of the Cold War, Finnish foreign policy became critical. Finland found itself between 
the United States and Western Europe and its large eastern neighbor, the Soviet 
Union. Finland’s aim was to remain a neutral country outside of great power politics; 
however, its role in WWII and the aftermath of the War left Finland in a tight spot. In 
1946, under President Juho Kusti Paasikivi, Finland undertook an effort to solidify its 
neutrality in the eyes of the great powers. (Jakobson, 2006, 49; Jussila et. al., 1999, 
252; Kirby, 1984, 159.) Ten years later, Urho Kekkonen became the Finnish 
president, and for twenty-five years he maintained and expanded the policy set forth 
by Paasikivi. This foreign policy line would become known as the Paasikivi-
Kekkonen Line. (Jakobson, 2006, 50-52; Jussila et. al., 1999, 276-281.) However, due 
to the excesses of Kekkonen’s rule and diminishing freedoms in Finland, criticisms of 
the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line began appearing. (Jakobson, 2006, 52; Jussila et. al., 
1999, 323-328.) Critics of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line began referring to Finland’s 
foreign policy as finlandization (Browning, 2002, 52). This thesis will refer to these 
two opposing approaches as the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line and finlandization. They 
frame the thesis’s discussion on Finnish foreign policy and epistemic communities.  
 Understanding these narratives in the discussion on Finnish Cold War foreign 
policy will allow this thesis to analyze the perceptions of the Finnish model in Finland 
today. Figure 1 below gives a pictorial expression of what the Finnish model is, and 
the two narratives described in this thesis. As is shown, the Finnish model itself is a 
model that relates to how a small state relates to a larger neighbor. From this, there are 
the two narratives, both defining the model in a different way. The exception to this is 
the second text box connected to finlandization. Internationally, particularly among 
American foreign policy experts, the term finlandization has become synonymous 
with the Finnish model (Brzezinski, 2014; Gilley, 2010). As the topic has become 
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popular internationally, it is useful to understand how Finnish experts themselves feel 
about it, especially as it is discussed as a possible foreign policy for other countries. 
 
This thesis will thusly first take a look at the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line 
narrative. This narrative is important as it describes the fundamental reasons for the 
Line. Following this, the thesis will turn to analyzing the finlandization narrative. This 
section will show the transition of the narrative from that of support for the Paasikivi-
Kekkonen Line to that of opposition. It also will focus much more on the presidency 
of Urho Kekkonen, because of the central role of Kekkonen in the finlandization 
narrative.  
 
2.2 Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line Saved Finland 
  
According to the first narrative, the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line was a successful 
foreign policy that allowed Finland to maintain its independence, territorial integrity, 
and a great amount of its sovereignty. After the end of Finland’s Continuation War 
with the Soviet Union in 1944, Finland had to find a new path to maintain its 
independence and territorial integrity. In 1946, J.K. Paasikivi became president of 
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Finland and led the country for the next ten years. In this time, he oversaw the start of 
Finnish neutrality, thanks to the removal of the Russian base at Porkkala (Jakobson, 
2006, 49), the safeguarding of Finnish democracy from the Communists (Jussila et al., 
1999, 252), in addition, as prime minister before becoming president, Paasikivi had 
already recognized the need for Finland to take a radically different course “to create 
lasting good-neighbourly relations with the Soviet Union” (Kirby, 1984, 159). 
Paasikivi and his successor Urho Kekkonen pursued this foreign policy line for the 
better part of 35 years. This section will now show how this foreign policy came to be 
and played out. 
Finnish independence was achieved in 1917 with the collapse of the Russian 
empire. Following independence, Finland had a short, but bloody, civil war in 1918. 
The ascendant Bolshevik leadership in the Soviet Union would have hoped for a 
victory of the Finnish labor movement in the civil war, but because of the victory of 
the Whites (the side consisting of monarchists and republicans, among others), the 
Soviet Union instead had to consider the possibility of Finland being used as a staging 
ground for an invasion of Russia (Apunen and Rytövuori, 1982, 68).  
During the interwar period (the period between the Finnish Civil War and the 
Winter War), the Soviet Union and Finland negotiated territorial settlements. On the 
one hand, these negotiations were quite broad, including economic and politico-
ideological perspectives; on the other hand, the Soviets were quite adamant in their 
negotiating for territories based on security concerns. For the Soviets, Finland 
represented a direct threat to the city of Leningrad; therefore, the Soviet Union needed 
to guarantee the defense of Leningrad on the Karelian Isthmus and in the Baltic Sea. 
However, Finland did not take these security concerns seriously until later in the 
negotiating process, and even then, abjectly refused to cede lands to the Soviets. 
(Apunen, 1977, 20-21; Jakobson, 2006, 27-29.)  
Apunen concludes that Paasikivi’s insights into Soviet security considerations 
“remains both valuable and stimulating” (1977, 30). Apunen shows how Finland’s 
lack of understanding of its strategic and geographical position in relation to the 
Soviet Union was a reason for the Soviet invasion of Finland in 1939. According to 
Apunen and Rytövuori, “the starting point of post-war Finnish-Soviet relations is that 
Finland has acknowledged the existence of a legitimate Soviet security interest (1982, 
72). Finland under Paasikivi finally addressed the Soviet Union’s security concerns 
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through the 1948 Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (Apunen, 
1977, 29-30).  
Max Jakobson praises President Paasikivi’s post-war policies. He argues that 
Paasikivi’s leadership allowed Finland to maintain its democracy. In other words, 
Finland “achieved a defensive political victory” (Jakobson, 2006, 47). In addition to 
winning this victory, Paasikivi also finally achieved Finnish neutrality by overseeing 
the removal of Soviet troops from the military base at Porkkala (ibid, 49).  
Paasikivi’s successor, Urho Kekkonen, maintained Paasikivi’s foreign policy 
stance. Finland’s position meant that relations with the Soviet Union were primary. 
Therefore, Kekkonen said that good Finnish-Western relations will come only “as a 
consequence of good Finno-Soviet relations”. (Apunen and Rytövuori, 1982, 72-73.) 
This was the basis on which Finnish neutrality was conducted (ibid.). Jakobson argues 
that Kekkonen’s presidency was more specifically about Finland proving to the Soviet 
Union that Finland was not a threat to Soviet defensive interests and that Finland 
would remain loyal to these interests. In the meantime, Kekkonen aimed to 
“[maintain] [Finland’s] democracy and [develop] its economic relations with the 
West.” (2006, 49.) Kekkonen was quite successful in this endeavour. During his 26 
years in the office of president of Finland, he maintained Finland’s neutrality, and he 
was able to achieve Finland’s agreement with the EEC. In fact, Finland’s agreement 
with the EEC is portrayed by Jakobson as a major success by Kekkonen. Had 
Kekkonen not successfully managed relations with the Soviet Union, Finland would 
have effectively been placed under the Soviet economy. He was also able to organize 
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1975, which is considered 
to be one of his best international achievements. (ibid, 50-52.)  
An analysis of thick images in Finnish foreign policy by Mika Aaltola 
described how Finland pursued the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line. At first, Finnish foreign 
policy as established by President Paasikivi was designed to take German Realpolitik 
and apply it to a small power. “The Finnish version of realism stressed that a small 
power has to come to terms with the legitimate interests of major powers. This meant 
that, since Finland’s position was marginal, its actions should be careful, modest, and 
moderate.” (Aaltola, 2010, 266.) The Finns also used historical lessons in their 
relations with Russia as a framework to keeping peace with the Soviet Union. The 
Finns should “[anticipate] the situations the Russians would consider critical or 
unacceptable in their relations with the Finns and thereby [avoid] them in advance” 
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(Alapuro, 2004, 94). Through the understanding of one’s place in the world is 
important, Finland did not just sit back idly and let the Soviet Union drive the Finnish 
car. As quoted above, Kekkonen’s statement that Finland could only have good 
relations with the West “as a consequence of good Finno-Soviet relations” (Apunen 
and Rytövuori, 1982, 73) was not in and of itself a denial of Finland’s possibility to 
pursue non-Soviet relations. Following World War Two, Finnish foreign policy was 
used as a means of keeping Finland out of harm’s way by staying out of the fray of 
international conflicts; however, “the purpose was to be active and to find added value 
in being a small power, to find mobility away from harm’s way” (Aaltola, 2010, 266). 
Because of this purpose, the interpretation of foreign policy became more active. 
Finland could try to reshape hard facts. (ibid, 266.)  
With a more active interpretation of its foreign policy, Finland was able to be 
more maneuverable in its relations with the Soviet Union and other international 
actors (ibid.). In fact, with such maneuverability, President Kekkonen was able to 
frame Finland as a doctor (ibid, 267). This image of Finland as a doctor went hand in 
hand with the image of Finland as a bridge-builder. Finland was no longer a mere 
vassal of the Soviet Union, but rather, a doctor who could heal the problems dividing 
the East and West. (ibid, 267.) This role between East and West directly served 
Finland’s foreign policy’s purpose of being active and staying out of harm’s way. 
On the domestic front, Paasikivi’s mission seemed to be the maintenance of 
the rule of law state and the protection of Finland against the People’s Democrats (the 
communists). Paasikivi laid out in a memorandum his beliefs on how the communists 
should be incorporated into future governments. He wrote that even if the communists 
are included in a coalition government, they should not hold the premiership or serve 
as the ministers of the foreign affairs, interior, trade, or defense ministries. (Jussila, et. 
al., 1995, 252.) Paasikivi believed that communists in these positions would not serve 
the interests of Finland, but rather the Soviet Union (ibid.). Annoyed by the lack of 
faith he had in Finnish ministers, Paasikivi set out to clean Finnish internal politics. 
Even though “Paasikivi considered it self-evident that Finland had to follow the 
obligatory line in its relations with the Soviet Union, there was no necessity whatever 
in his opinion for concessions in internal politics.” (ibid, 252.) This meant that 
Paasikivi had to undergo the process of cleaning up subversive elements in Finnish 
society. This included dissolving Valpo (the secret police) and removing Hella 
Wuolijoki as head of the Finnish Broadcasting Corporation. (Jussila et. al., 1995, 253; 
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Kirby, 1984, 164.) For the most part, the Soviet Union accepted Paasikivi’s directives 
over internal Finnish matters (Jussila et. al., 1995, 255).  
However, Paasikivi’s record on avoiding internal interference was not without 
blemish. In 1945 and early 1946, under pressure from the Allied Control Commission 
(headed by the Soviet Union in Helsinki), Paasikivi, as prime minister, pushed laws 
through the Finnish parliament (the Eduskunta) that would allow Finland to prosecute 
its war criminals as Finland was required to do under article 13 of the armistice. All 
men put on trial were found guilty and sentenced to multiple years in prison. (Kirby, 
1984, 162-163.) However, in the end, not one of the sentenced men would serve their 
full prison term because Paasikivi pardoned them soon after (Jussila et. al., 1995, 
253). 
In 1950, Urho Kekkonen became the prime minister of Finland. Already he 
was hoping to take advantage of the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual 
Assistance in order to “strengthen … relations that would lead to cooperation” (ibid, 
257). However, Kekkonen’s understanding of the need for cooperation between the 
Soviet Union and Finland was only acknowledged by his own party and the People’s 
Democrats (ibid, 260).  
Kekkonen was elected to his first term as president of Finland in 1956. In the 
early years of his reign as Finnish president, Kekkonen faced two seismic crises. The 
first crisis, the Night Frost Crisis, resulted in the dissolution of the Eduskunta. The 
second crisis, the Note Crisis, again resulted in the dissolution of the Eduskunta under 
pressure from the Soviet Union, but it also ensured Kekkonen’s reelection as 
president. These crises ensured that Kekkonen would remain as Finland’s political 
master, and that Kekkonen would continue his foreign policy line. (ibid, 276-281.) 
Following the Note crisis, Kekkonen stated that “Finnish neutrality presupposed four 
conditions: acknowledgement by foreign powers, their trust in it, the support of the 
Finnish people, and the Finnish people’s readiness to repel any violations of this 
neutrality” (ibid, 308).  
During his 26 years as president of Finland, Kekkonen made great efforts in 
foreign policy. Kekkonen had some defeats in his foreign policy ambitions, such as 
his attempt to create a Nordic nuclear-free zone (ibid, 308-309). However, he also had 
several successes. When power in the Soviet Union was handed over from 
Khrushchev to Brezhnev, Kekkonen made sure that the new Soviet authorities 
maintained the status quo in regards to Finland. As well the Strategic Arms Limitation 
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Talks (SALT) were conducted in Helsinki in 1969. These successes along with 
membership in the EEC and the CSCE (mentioned earlier) were major achievements 
for Kekkonen. They brought Finland international recognition. (ibid, 309-313.)   
 
2.3 Finlandization Narrative: a Critical Take on the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line 
 
 The term finlandization was introduced as a criticism of the Paasikivi-
Kekkonen Line. Critics of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line argued that it was a policy of 
self-subjugation and that Finland’s efforts to assuage the Soviet Union went above 
and beyond what was necessary for Finland to defend its independence. However, in 
recent years, the term has come to be used outside of Finland not as a criticism, but as 
a modern understanding of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line. In this research, 
finlandization will refer to the criticism of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line.  
While the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line had a positive connotation in Finland 
through much of the Cold War, in the 1970’s, the term finlandization came to be the 
main term that defined Western criticism of Finnish foreign policy. In Finland, the 
term finlandization was a sign of the West’s misunderstanding of Finland’s foreign 
policy; however, after the end of the Cold War, the finlandization narrative became 
dominant. (Aaltola, 2010, 268.)  
In an analysis of westernizing narratives in Finnish foreign policy, Christopher 
Browning describes how new narratives in Finnish foreign policy have taken a new 
look at Finnish Cold War foreign policy. Overall the Westernizing narrative held that 
Finland had not “skillfully avoided the pitfalls of Cold War power politics to maintain 
a position of magnanimous neutrality,” but rather it had “in fact [become] complicit 
with the propaganda of the Soviet totalitarian empire …” (Browning, 2002, 53-54). In 
post-Cold War Finland, responsibility for this complicity with the Soviet Union was 
placed at the feet of President Kekkonen. Particularly, Finns, since the Cold War, 
view “Kekkonen’s playing of the ‘Moscow Card’ … as having been a euphemism for 
the legitimization of authoritarian style politics at home.” (ibid, 54.) An example of 
this is seen in Finland’s agreement with the EEC. Jakobson had chalked this victory 
up to Kekkonen’s skills, but modern views of the EEC agreement do not agree. 
Rather, Kekkonen’s ability to extend his presidency four more years in without 
elections is seen as the reason why the Soviet Union accepted the Finnish EEC 
agreement. (ibid, 67 note 9.) 
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With the emergence of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line as Finland’s foreign 
policy, the Finnish foreign ministry made it its goal to maintain the Line. Because the 
Soviet Union carefully observed Finnish society’s discourse about the Soviet Union, 
the foreign ministry saw the need to limit freedom of expression in Finland in order to 
show the Soviets that there was no risk to Soviet security. (Kullaa, 2012, 72.) Such 
observations of Finland by the Soviet Union were not limited to analyzing the Finnish 
discourse on the Soviet Union. In fact, the Soviet Union was very much observing the 
whole of the Finnish political atmosphere. A cornerstone of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen 
Line was the belief that Finland needed to appease the Soviet Union. Therefore, 
“Finland stayed out of international organisations when the Soviet Union resisted” 
(Forsberg and Pesu, 2016, 480).   
The Night Frost Crisis in 1958 was a strong indication of the influence that the 
Soviet Union could exert over Finland. After the elections of 1958, a new Social 
Democrat-Conservative (the Social Democratic Party [SDP] and the National 
Coalition Party [NCP]) government was formed. Even before the formation of the 
new government, the Soviet Union was already warning Finland against just such an 
alliance. The Soviets did not understand why the Finns would abruptly turn away 
from the politics of the Agrarian party. (Kullaa, 2012, 159.) Finland’s foreign ministry 
was pressured by the Soviets to prevent an SDP-NCP government from forming, but 
was in no position to actually be able to prevent the government from forming (ibid, 
160-161). As a result of the growing crisis a war of words began emerging between 
Finland and the Soviet Union. To prevent the Finnish mood from becoming too 
hostile to the Soviet Union, Kekkonen began censoring publications that he himself 
deemed detrimental to Finnish-Soviet relations. (ibid, 164-165.) In the end, Kekkonen 
forced the resignation of the government, and was promised by a KGB confidante that 
Soviet relations with Finland would resume, though, the new government would have 
to be composed of at least two communists. Kekkonen refused to add communists 
into the new government, but, in the end, the new government, lacking any SDP or 
NCP ministers, was satisfactory for the Soviets. (ibid, 169-170.) 
Three years after the Night Frost Crisis, the Note Crisis emerged. Ostensibly 
the Note Crisis was initiated by the Soviet Union’s fears of a revanchist West 
Germany (Maude, 2011, 239). Struggling with a parliament that did not support him, 
it was believed that Kekkonen may have requested such a note from the Soviet Union 
(ibid, 237-239). The note, delivered to the Finnish embassy in Moscow, became a 
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point of crisis because it expressed Soviet fears of West Germany, and, as a result, the 
Soviets wanted to undergo military consultations with Finland (ibid, 240). Following 
a meeting with Khrushchev in Novosibirsk, Kekkonen returned home, having 
triumphantly solved the Note Crisis without military consultations needing to take 
place between Finland and the Soviet Union. As a result of this success and a section 
of the note strongly criticizing Kekkonen’s opposition, the strongest opposition to 
Kekkonen’s reelection bid collapsed and Kekkonen was reelected easily. (ibid, 240-
241.) 
Following the crises, Kekkonen had reduced the space between the president 
and parliament and from then on had the power to simply dissolve governments as he 
saw fit (ibid, 247-248). By doing so, Kekkonen had increased his own power, a power 
which derived from his relations with the Soviet Union (ibid, 250). 
With the narrowing of the space between the power of the president and the 
power of the parliament, finlandization became “increasingly inter-woven with 
Kekkonen and his dominance and the consolidation of his hegemony in the Finnish 
political life (sic)” (Forsberg and Pesu, 2016, 481). The worst aspects of 
finlandization are associated with Kekkonen’s rule. Kekkonen “conduct[ed] 
undemocratic measures by exceeding his constitutional powers, working through 
personalised networks, and concealing relevant information from others as a means of 
control” (ibid.). The aforementioned extension of his presidency in 1973 is another 
example of his dominance of Finland’s political landscape, while his exclusion of the 
National Coalition Party from government for 21 years is an example of the Soviet 
influence in Finland’s political landscape (ibid.).    
By the end of Kekkonen’s final term as president, critics of the Paasikivi-
Kekkonen Line became more vocal. In particular, criticisms of the Line lamented the 
ban on criticizing the Soviet Union and its society. Moreover, there was a questioning 
of the idea that it was unpatriotic to questions the president’s views on Soviet 
relations. (Maude, 2011, 262.) Tuomas Forsberg and Matti Pesu say that it is difficult 
to say whether the finlandization of Finland was forced or not, and that arguments for 
one way or the other would be weak. However, they argue that the transfer of power 
from Kekkonen to Koivisto, the end of finlandization with this transfer of power, and 
the lack of any strong reaction in Soviet-Finnish relations suggest “an exaggeration of 
the extent of domestic accommodation.” (Forsberg and Pesu, 2016, 489.)         
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The acceptance of the finlandization narrative in post-Cold War Finland has 
led to a general shift in Finnish politics. Post-Cold War policy had to be the antithesis 
of Cold War policy, both internally and externally. Internally, this meant that Finland 
had to aim for “more open and transparent politics, support for freedom of expression, 
and the delinking of the media from the state …” (Browning, 2002, 55). Externally, 
Finland looked to the West. This meant a new understanding of what these institutions 
meant and stood for. Following the end of the Cold War, Finns felt as if they had been 
misled by Kekkonen. Because of this, the desire was to bring Finland into Western 
institutions, where Finland naturally belonged. (ibid, 55.) In addition to this, the 
legitimacy of Finnish neutrality was called into question. Those who favored 
westernizing narratives argued that Western interpretations of the Soviet Union turned 
out right, therefore, because of this, Finland’s neutrality “was akin to free-riding on 
the back of Western security institutions …”  As a result, understandings of 
organizations, such as NATO, in Finland turned from negative to positive. (ibid, 55.)   
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
           The discussion on the history of the Finnish Cold War foreign policy line is no 
simple matter. On the one hand, the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line narrative describes 
Finnish Cold War foreign policy as Finland’s means of survival during the Cold War. 
The story is told that had Finland acted otherwise it might not have maintained its 
independence. The more negative aspects of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line were not 
pretty but had to be done, and Finland did all these things in a Finnish way, not a 
Soviet way. On the other hand, the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line has been criticized 
following the end of the rule of President Kekkonen. The finlandization narrative 
emerged in Finland near the end of Kekkonen’s final presidential term. This narrative 
focused around the persona of Kekkonen himself. Critics of Kekkonen pointed to the 
excesses of Kekkonen’s rule as evidence of finlandization. They questioned whether 
Finland needed to go so far in finlandizing itself to the Soviet Union. With the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, this narrative became dominant, and Finland began a 
move westward.  
These two narratives do not live in total isolation from one another. The 
Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line narrators tend to focus their narrative on the foreign affairs 
aspects of the Line. The excesses of Kekkonen are not focused on possibly because 
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they see it as a distraction from the overall success of the Line. The finlandization 
narrators, who focus on Kekkonen’s excesses, agree that the Line was successful, but 
because of the restrictions on freedom applied on Finnish society in the name of good 
Soviet relations, they argue that it was dangerous.  
Because the Finnish model has become a recommended solution for the 
conflict in Ukraine, it is important that the Finnish model is well understood. 
Understanding these narratives in the discussion on Finnish Cold War foreign policy 
will allow this thesis to analyze the perceptions of the Finnish model in Finland today 
and to understand the model itself.    
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3. Epistemic Communities 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
 The theory of epistemic communities is the idea that groups of experts can 
come together to influence policy outcomes for the betterment of society as a whole 
without any goals of personal enrichment in any form (Haas, 1992, 3; Cross, 2013, 
142). This thesis centers around the idea that an epistemic community of foreign 
policy experts exists in Finland, and that this epistemic community has influence on 
how foreign policy issues are perceived.  
 However, in order to determine the efficacy of any Finnish epistemic 
community, one must understand exactly what the theory of epistemic communities 
entails. This thesis plans to do just that by first addressing the special edition of 
International Organization edited by Peter Haas, in which the theory of epistemic 
communities is thoroughly defined and established. This edition of International 
Organization was seminal in the study of epistemic communities, and one cannot 
study the theory without first studying this work. Of course, this work was followed 
by criticisms of the theory as it was defined by Haas. These criticisms must be 
addressed in order to see how the theory has developed and grown. Key to the aspect 
of growth in this theory is Mai’a K. Davis Cross’s works on epistemic communities. 
Cross in her works broadened the scope and understanding of what an epistemic 
community is. Her works are as essential to the study of epistemic communities as 
Haas’s, and therefore, it is crucial to understand how she has contributed to the theory. 
Finally, this thesis will take a look at epistemic communities in the context of 
domestic politics. The literature on epistemic communities is overwhelmingly focused 
on the transnational and international applications of the theory, so it is important to 
see how epistemic community theory holds up in the domestic context, especially 
since this thesis will analyze a domestic epistemic community.   
 
3.2 Epistemic Communities 
 
 John Gerard Ruggie devised his definition of epistemic communities from 
Michel Foucault’s term ‘episteme’. An episteme being, as defined by Foucault, 
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“knowledge, envisaged apart from all criteria having reference to its rational value or 
to its objective forms, grounds its positivity and thereby manifests a history which is 
not that of its growing perfection, but rather that of its conditions of possibility…” 
(1970, xxiii-xxiv).   Ruggie took the term “to refer to a dominant way of looking at 
social reality, a set of shared symbols and references, mutual expectations and a 
mutual predictability of intention.” (Ruggie, 1975, 569-570.) Ruggie seemed 
interested in how epistemic communities were becoming more internationalized; 
however, his understanding of epistemic communities was much more abstract 
compared to more recent understandings. According to Ruggie, an epistemic 
community is used by a state for simply making collective responses in given 
situations (ibid, 570). Ruggie’s understanding of epistemic community was an early 
understanding of the phenomenon; however, a more in-depth study of epistemic 
communities appeared in 1992 in a special edition of the journal International 
Organizations edited by Peter Haas. 
This special edition of International Organizations was a breakthrough in the 
study of the theory of epistemic communities. It was a large volume of works 
dedicated to studying, understanding, and explaining the role and use of epistemic 
communities. In the introduction article, appropriately titled as “Introduction: 
Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination”, Haas defines an 
epistemic community as “a network of professionals with recognized expertise and 
competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant 
knowledge within that domain or issue-area” (1992, 3). Moreover, an epistemic 
community has four common characteristics shared by its members (even when an 
epistemic community is made up of members from various disciplines and 
backgrounds): the members have:  
 
(1) a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, which provide a 
value-based rationale for the social action of community members; (2) 
shared causal beliefs, which are derived from their analysis of practices 
leading or contributing to a central set of problems in their domain and 
which then serve as the basis for elucidating the multiple linkages 
between possible policy actions and desired outcomes; (3) shared 
notions of validity- that is, intersubjective, internally defined criteria 
for weighing and validating knowledge in the domain of their 
expertise; and (4) a common policy enterprise-that is, a set of common 
practices associated with a set of problems to which their professional 
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competence is directed, presumably out of the conviction that human 
welfare will be enhanced as a consequence. (ibid.) 
 
These four characteristics have become the pillars of the theory of epistemic 
community. As will be shown later in this paper, among supporters and critics of this 
theory, these four pillars of epistemic community are respected and seem almost 
immutable thus far.  
 The emergence of epistemic communities became obvious in the middle of the 
twentieth century as countries’ bureaucracies began growing, and thusly, relying on 
technical expertise to understand the changing world (ibid, 7-11). However, such 
technical expertise typically comes about as a result of uncertainty of a given event or 
phenomenon and its level of complexity, especially in a time of crisis or shock (ibid, 
12-15). As a relatively new theory, Adler and Haas wrote that “epistemic 
communities are not in the business of controlling societies; what they control is 
international problems. Their approach is instrumental, and their life is limited to the 
time and space defined by the problem and its solutions” (1992, 371).  
Distinguishing between an epistemic community and other groups can be a 
task. Haas makes clear that an epistemic community is not a group that can be simply 
relegated to the realm of the sciences, but rather an epistemic community can consist 
of members from many disciplines and professions with the prerequisite that they 
“have a sufficiently strong claim to a body of knowledge…” (Haas, 1992, 16). Even 
politicians can be involved in epistemic communities as will be shown later in this 
paper by a review of Patrik Marier’s case study of Swedish pension reform. The 
professionalism and level of expertise of an epistemic community is what gives it 
access to the political system, which in turn legitimizes the efforts of the epistemic 
community (ibid, 17). Given that an epistemic community can have a diverse 
membership, it runs the risk that it may appear as a different group (i.e. an interest 
group) or, even, that a different group may appear as an epistemic community. 
However, Haas’s characteristics of an epistemic community can be applied as a test to 
determine the nature of a group (i.e. is it an epistemic community or a special interest 
group?). Haas even lays out the differences in a simple chart, which has been copied 
below in figure 2.  
In figure 2, it can be seen that in order for a group to be considered an 
epistemic community, it must first share causal and principled beliefs, what Haas also 
19 
 
calls analytical and normative beliefs (ibid, 18), and it must have a consensual 
knowledge base and shared interests. 
Therefore, if one of these pieces is missing, then the group ceases to be an epistemic 
community, and becomes something different. For example, a group of researchers 
who share causal beliefs but not principled beliefs should be considered to be a 
professional group, while a group with shared principled beliefs but not causal beliefs 
should be considered to be an interest group or social movement. 
Another important factor to remember when investigating an epistemic 
community is that an epistemic community may be domestic or transnational, and that 
its members can meet in a variety of ways at regular or irregular times. Haas contends 
that transnational epistemic communities are stronger than domestic ones, because a 
transnational epistemic community has a larger diffusion area. (1992, 17.)  
One aspect of Haas’s understanding of epistemic communities that is 
theoretically important is that “reality is socially constructed” (ibid, 21). If it is given 
that knowledge itself is socially constructed, then there can be no objective claims on 
knowledge (ibid.). Haas does not dispute this idea. Instead he points to an alternative 
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idea that consensual knowledge is formed over time and verified through validity tests 
(ibid, 23). This is the form of knowledge that epistemic communities form, and those 
that are able to voice their knowledge will have influence in the public and political 
spheres (ibid.). Thusly, if consensual knowledge is what epistemic communities form, 
then they must rely on validity tests (Haas’s third characteristic of epistemic 
community) in order to confirm their knowledge (ibid.).  
Finally, the aim of an epistemic community is to transfer its knowledge on. 
Meaning that its members’ combined expertise has been put together “presumably out 
of the conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a consequence (Haas, 1992, 
3)”; and therefore, the logical aim of the epistemic community would be to influence 
policy coordination. Haas reckons that when an epistemic community’s consensual 
knowledge gains recognition by policy makers, then a level of policy coordination can 
begin (ibid, 29-30). Following this, Adler and Haas hypothesize that the level of 
mobilization and ability to gain influence by an epistemic community within its own 
country, increases the chance that the country will then use its power in support of the 
epistemic community’s ideals and practices, therefore, aiding in the epistemic 
community’s international institutionalization (Adler and Haas, 1992, 371-372).     
Policy coordination is a significant part of the work of epistemic communities. 
However, once policy coordination is achieved, “this path-dependent evolutionary 
model implies that the effects of epistemic involvement are not easily reversed” (ibid, 
372-373). Epistemic communities play an important role in policy coordination 
through the steps of policy evolution, which are policy innovation, policy diffusion, 
policy selection and policy persistence (ibid, 373). Epistemic communities aid in 
policy innovation in three ways: they “[frame] the range of political controversy 
surrounding an issue, [define] state interests, and [set] standards” (ibid, 375).  
After an epistemic community has influenced policy innovation, the new 
policy can then be diffused. Conferences and publications are just two ways in which 
an epistemic community can diffuse its ideas transnationally, even if an epistemic 
community is only nationally oriented (ibid, 378). Through the diffusion of ideas, 
epistemic communities play a role in policy coordination. Adler and Haas have drawn 
four conclusions from their research on epistemic communities that demonstrate the 
importance of policy diffusion for an epistemic community. Firstly, an epistemic 
community’s ability to diffuse its ideas nationally is important, but if it acquires 
power in just one country (or in just one international body), then its power is 
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dependent on the country’s (or body’s) international influence; therefore, an epistemic 
community that can diffuse its ideas transnationally, can thus influence international 
policy coordination. Secondly, similar to the first conclusion, an epistemic 
community’s embeddedness in a country’s regulatory agencies allows the epistemic 
community to influence the setting of standards and policy development of that 
country; however, the diffusion of its ideas transnationally would, again, allow it to 
influence international policy coordination. Thirdly, an epistemic community that 
gains power or embeddedness in a major/strong state or institution (according to its 
strength and role in negotiations on a specific issue) will have greater influence over 
international policy, than an epistemic community which gains power in a 
minor/weak state or institution. (ibid, 379-380). One could think of these first three 
conclusions as a parasite/host metaphor. An epistemic community that is unable to 
diffuse its ideas transnationally is beholden to the influence of its host. (The host 
being the country or institution that the epistemic community holds influence in.) The 
fourth conclusion is more about the composition of the epistemic community itself. 
The size of the epistemic community does not reflect its ability to influence on 
international policy coordination. In fact, epistemic communities enshrine the idea of 
quality over quantity. The size of the epistemic community (meaning the number of 
members) is not as important as the level of expertise of each member of the 
epistemic community (Adler and Haas, 1992, 380). For example, an epistemic 
community which consists of ten environmental studies professors proposing a 
solution for the safe disposal of nuclear waste will probably find that their ideas 
diffuse more easily than an epistemic community of 100 bachelor’s students.  
The next step in policy evolution is policy selection. This is the point at which 
political bodies take the policy ideas of epistemic communities and turn them into 
reality. However, policy selection is not as easy as it may seem. An epistemic 
community is bound by political realities. In a best case scenario for an epistemic 
community, decision makers are unfamiliar with a given problem, and therefore, the 
epistemic community can shape the issue and characterize the interests of the decision 
makers. In contrast, when decision makers have knowledge of a problem, they can 
then select an epistemic community that aligns with their own views of the problem 
giving influence to that epistemic community. However, in such a circumstance, the 
epistemic community will not have the ability to shape the interest of decision 
makers, but rather it will have to justify and promote its ideas, which align with the 
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decision makers’ (ibid, 381). As well, the decision makers are more likely to give 
influence to epistemic communities which lie in the mainstream. Epistemic 
communities that lie outside the mainstream or that tend to be more radical are often 
impeded in their attempts to influence decision makers (ibid, 381-382). 
The final step in policy evolution is policy persistence. This is the point at 
which the effects of epistemic involvement are no longer easily reversed (ibid, 372-
373). An epistemic community arrives to this point through continuous effort and 
socialization. As its ideas become institutionalized, they run the chance of becoming 
orthodoxy (ibid, 384). However, the epistemic community must retain its consensus in 
order to maintain its influence (ibid.). Once “an epistemic community loses its 
consensus, its authority is diminished and decision makers tend to pay less attention to 
its advice” (ibid, 385). 
 Haas, in his special edition of International Organization, was able to define 
and solidify the theory of epistemic communities. This edition of IO became the 
seminal work for the study of epistemic communities and has provided researchers a 
foundation for task of discovering and examining epistemic communities.  
 
3.3 Criticisms of Epistemic Communities 
 
Although the epistemic community edition of International Organization was 
seminal in the study of epistemic communities, it was not without its detractors. From 
the critics of epistemic community theory, there have emerged approximately four 
main critiques. First, it has been argued that Haas’s work gives supremacy to 
epistemic communities over other groups. Second, Dave Toke argues that Haas needs 
to move from a positivist approach to a post-positivist social constructivist approach. 
Third, most of the critics of epistemic community theory argue that there is no clear 
explanation of how epistemic communities influence governments any more than 
other groups. Finally, James K. Sebenius criticizes the theory for lacking a theory of 
bargaining that would explain how epistemic communities work with other groups in 
order to create winning coalitions.      
One critic of Haas’s explanation of epistemic communities was Dave Toke. 
Toke argues that Haas holds a positivist position which over exaggerates the effects of 
epistemic communities. He believes that special interest groups are at the least equal 
to epistemic communities in their ability to shape norms (Toke, 1999, 99). In fact, 
23 
 
Toke argues that it is possible for a special interest group to be even more effective 
than an epistemic community, thus showing that Haas over exaggerates the effects of 
epistemic communities (ibid, 100-101).  
Toke maintains that “Haas’s work implies that epistemic communities are, 
because of their validity tests and commitment to apparent scientific truth, in a better 
position to judge environmental policy than environmental groups” (ibid, 101). Toke 
argues against this, stating that his evidence has shown that issues are normative and 
socially constructed; therefore, special interests groups are just as capable as 
epistemic communities to make normative judgements (ibid.). According to Toke, 
“there is an acceptance of a broadly positivist position concerning the role of scientists 
as the legitimate bearers of truth…” (ibid.). However, Toke believes this to be 
completely unjustified and argues that it is time to move to a post-positivist position 
(ibid.). He concludes that moving to a social constructivist position “will lead us to a 
model of environmental policy that allows us to fully analyse the importance of 
various interest groups in shaping outcomes” (ibid.). 
The very next year, Claire Dunlop wrote a response to Toke’s criticism of 
Haas. In her criticism, Dunlop critiqued Toke’s critique of Haas and critiqued Haas as 
well.  
One of Toke’s biggest critiques of Haas’s work was that Haas gave too much 
value to epistemic communities over other special interest groups. However, Dunlop 
counters this argument by stating that Haas was attempting to fill a gap in major 
International Relations theory by moving “beyond the existing structure/agency 
binary … rather than attempting to establish a hegemonic position for epistemic 
communities over environmental groups” (Dunlop, 2000, 139).  
Dunlop also critiques Toke’s understanding of Haas’s works. She argues that 
what Toke sees as a positivist approach is vastly overstated (ibid, 137, 139-140). In 
fact, Dunlop found that Haas’s approach is in line with social constructivists, and that 
Haas’s lack of coverage on positivism was another point against Toke’s accusation of 
Haas’s positivist approach (ibid, 139-140). 
However, Dunlop and Toke’s views do converge, when they criticize Haas for 
his weakness in explaining how epistemic communities and other special interest 
groups co-exist (ibid, 140-141). Dunlop argues that the uncertainty of an epistemic 
community’s political power contributes to this question of how epistemic 
communities and special interest groups co-exist (ibid, 141). Because epistemic 
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communities need to cooperate with decision makers there is a risk that their 
“‘consensual knowledge’ may overstate the influence these expert enclaves alone can 
have” (ibid.). To rectify this problem, Dunlop says that Haas’s four characteristics 
(quoted earlier in section II) must be “problematized and their importance relative to 
each other elucidated” (ibid, 142). Dunlop concludes that more has to be done to test 
the characteristics of an epistemic community in order to know whether some 
characteristics can be more important than others, and how this affects competition 
between epistemic communities and other groups (ibid, 142). Such an effort can be 
referred to as a theory of competition (Cross, 2011, 24). 
Ronald Krebs also sees a limit to the potential influence of epistemic 
communities not residing within government. He argues that their technical expertise 
may dominate decision making in government, but beyond such technical knowledge 
epistemic community theory does not explain “how state leaders acquire their 
information about basic issues in international relations.” (Krebs, 2001, 225-226.)   
Another critique of Haas’s work on epistemic communities focuses on how 
epistemic communities actually turn their policy projects into policy when faced with 
competition from other groups. Dunlop, while suggesting how Haas’s theory’s 
problem with other groups could be improved, cited James K. Sebenius’s article in the 
special edition of International Organization. Dunlop agreed with Sebenius’s 
conclusion that in order for epistemic communities to gain influence, they must 
‘bargain’ and make ‘winning coalitions’ with other actors in the policy making 
process. (Dunlop, 2000, 141-142; Sebenius, 1992, 326, 352.)  
Sebenius argues that Haas’s theory of how epistemic communities influence 
policy making is wholly incomplete. Haas, according to Sebenius, misses the 
importance of epistemic communities strategically interacting with other groups and 
working to ensure their preferred policy outcome. Key to this is the shared beliefs of 
the actors. (Sebenius, 1992, 356.) “More generally, the translation of epistemic 
consensus into actual measures of policy coordination - that is to say the ultimate 
influence of the epistemic community - occurs through bargaining” (ibid, 357). 
However, Sebenius sees no theory of bargaining within the theory of epistemic 
communities. In fact, he states that Haas’s view on this matter is again “incomplete 
and misleading” (ibid.). He views the combination of consensual knowledge and 
bureaucratic power as a way to produce outcomes (ibid.). Ronald 
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Sebenius’s core criticism of Haas’s epistemic community theory is that Haas’s 
explanation of epistemic communities fails to explain explicitly how epistemic 
communities’ shared beliefs affect policy outcome (ibid.). As mentioned earlier, 
Sebenius’s conclusion is that for an epistemic community’s shared beliefs to affect 
policy outcomes, the epistemic community must bargain with competing groups and 
form winning coalitions (ibid, 357-359). Ronald Krebs criticizes epistemic 
communities in a similar fashion. Krebs argued that even when military officers in 
America and Europe have formed something similar to an epistemic community, the 
truth remains that each one competes to control the agenda. (Krebs, 2001, 225.) 
Because of this, Krebs states that the persuasive power of an epistemic community is 
a rarer phenomenon than a predictable one (ibid.).     
According to Sebenius, when looking at an epistemic community as a de facto 
natural coalition, it is possible to hypothesize how they expand into winning 
coalitions. They would have “to be more influential in step with several factors: the 
greater their extent and depth, the stronger their cohesiveness, the more consistent 
their beliefs, the more resonant their policy project with outside scientific and popular 
opinion, the more opportune their bureaucratic placement, and the weaker their actual 
and potential opponents.” (Sebenius, 1992, 360.) Such an epistemic community would 
then have to negotiate its way to a winning coalition. Sebenius outlines five devices 
which an epistemic community can use to create a winning coalition:  
     
“First, to the extent that an epistemic community shapes perceptions of 
interests, it affects the psychological yardstick by which potential agreements 
as well as alternatives to negotiated agreement are measured … Second, to the 
extent that valuable new agreements are invented, the perceived conflict of 
interest may decrease still further … Third, if an epistemic community can 
cause issues to be linked in a manner that worsens the opponents' alternatives 
to agreement with its proposed policy project, this will shift the disagreement 
point and improve the chances that the community's project is accepted … 
Fourth, an epistemic community may advantageously affect the perceived 
zone of possible agreement to the extent that issues are framed and potential 
solutions or agreements are made salient in a way favorable to the 
community's policy project. Fifth, binding commitments to preferred outcomes 
may be possible” (ibid, 361). 
  
This section of the paper has covered the criticisms of Haas’s epistemic 
community theory and shown how the theory’s critics have suggested it might be 
improved. As is the case for all theories, criticism unearths faults and underdeveloped 
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aspects of the theory, and it is a crucial part of the development of a theory. Next this 
paper will see how epistemic community theory has addressed these criticisms and 
developed over time.  
       
3.4 Cross’s Suggestions to Correct Criticisms 
 
Twenty years after this seminal edition of International Organization, Mai’a 
K. Davis Cross revisited the theory of epistemic communities. She argues that the 
theory of epistemic communities has not developed much since this edition of 
International Organization. In fact, with time Cross believes that the theory has 
become marginalized. Too often research has focused on scientists and technicians as 
the members of epistemic communities, and, according to Cross, this has limited 
epistemic communities. (Cross, 2013, 137-138.) Therefore, Cross has set out to 
reconceptualize the theory of epistemic communities. 
Cross sets out to show that an epistemic community’s membership is not the 
driving force behind its persuasiveness, but rather its “internal cohesion and 
professionalism” drive its ability to persuade (ibid, 147). She “hypothesizes that if an 
epistemic community is not internally cohesive, then it is less likely to be as 
persuasive as one that is” (ibid.). In her work, Cross “identified four innovations [to 
the theory of epistemic community], which address: (1) the variation in internal 
cohesion within epistemic communities and the central importance of 
professionalism; (2) the role of uncertainty in understanding epistemic community 
influence; (3) the relationship between epistemic communities and governments; and 
(4) the nature of knowledge” (ibid, 147-148).  
When thinking of an epistemic community, it is easy to think of it in a simple 
binary way: either it exists or it does not. However, Cross argues that this is not the 
case. In fact, epistemic communities can exist at different degrees of being. Compared 
to other epistemic communities or actors an epistemic community may find itself in a 
stronger or weaker position. (ibid, 148.)  
External factors, such as competing epistemic communities and actors, threats, 
and costs, can affect an epistemic community’s ability to influence decision makers 
(ibid.). Given the external factors, an epistemic community must be strong in order to 
exert influence. Cross argues that an epistemic community’s level of internal 
coherence is a significant factor in determining its strength, along with its possession 
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of recognized experts (ibid.). Cross “argues that socialisation, relationships, and 
persuasive processes within the epistemic community are even more important in 
ultimately determining its strength or weakness (ibid, 148-149).  
Cross supports Haas’s position that epistemic communities should be viewed 
from a constructivist point of view. However, she devotes rather little time to the 
importance of constructivism. She believes that epistemic communities’ shaping of 
knowledge and interests are inherently socially constructed (ibid, 149), but, in her 
opinion, professionalism is the key to an epistemic community’s ability to share its 
policy projects (ibid.). 
Cross disagrees with Haas’s belief that validity tests are central to an epistemic 
community’s claim to knowledge. Because Cross believes that professionalism is 
central to the makeup of an epistemic community, she argues that shared causal 
beliefs and common policy enterprises are the most important characteristics of an 
epistemic community (Cross, 2011, 25). Primarily, Cross points to shared causal 
beliefs as the most significant characteristic of an epistemic community because it 
“reflects the long-term analytical capabilities of a profession” (ibid, 25-26).        
To explain how professionalism exists in epistemic communities, Cross 
defines four variables that apply to an epistemic community’s professions. These 
variables are important because they both show the professionalism in an epistemic 
community and that professionalism can be measured on a “strong-weak continuum” 
instead of “having a specific sufficiency minimum” (Cross, 2013, 150).  
The first variable is selection and training. This variable addresses how an 
epistemic community is formed. The competitiveness of selection ensures that an 
epistemic community’s experts are at a high level in their professions. Then, if the 
individuals of an epistemic community have undergone a precise training, they are 
more likely to be recognized as experts and to have a strong cohesion amongst 
themselves. (ibid, 150.) As well, when the standards of selection and training are 
consistent in a transnational epistemic community, the community is likely to be more 
cohesive (ibid.).  
The second variable is meeting frequency and quality. Cross hypothesizes here 
that the quality and frequency of meetings directly affects an epistemic community’s 
cohesiveness. By meeting frequently, the members of an epistemic community “build 
strong ties, strengthen shared professional norms, and cultivate a common culture” 
(ibid.). Small group meetings give the epistemic community an added layer of 
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cohesion by allowing “socialisation and the development of a common culture” 
(ibid.).   
The third variable is shared professional norms. The shared professional norms 
of an epistemic community center around its “protocol, procedure, and standards of 
consensus-building” (ibid.). Even upon disagreements, the professional norms of an 
epistemic community give it a foundation on which they can eventually come to 
consensus or compromise (ibid.).  
The fourth and final variable is common culture. Common culture is the glue 
that holds together an epistemic community. According to Cross, it is “the sense of 
purpose, identity, symbolism, and heritage within the community” (ibid.).  
Each of these four variables, as mentioned above, can be measured on a 
strong-weak continuum. An epistemic community that leans towards the strong end of 
the continuum on each variable will be more cohesive than one that leans to the 
weaker end. This may go some way to explaining the influence and persuasiveness of 
an epistemic community, but more research would have to be done to find out (ibid, 
151).  
Building on the innovation of internal cohesion and professionalism, Cross 
turned to her second innovation: uncertainty. Haas has mentioned the impact of 
uncertainty on epistemic communities before. Haas stated that it is often “a crisis or 
shock” that makes a government or institution turn to an epistemic community (Haas, 
1992, 14). However, Cross argues that this is not the case at all. She argues that 
uncertainty is a constant in international relations. Cross agrees that uncertainty opens 
up a gap in policy making for epistemic communities, but she does not believe the 
degree of uncertainty has a strong meaningful impact on an epistemic community’s 
influence. (Cross, 2013, 151-152.) Meaning that the uncertainty following a shock or 
crisis, which may seem very strong, will not necessarily increase an epistemic 
community’s impact. Rather, Cross argues, an existing epistemic community that has 
proven to be internally cohesive will continue being influential even as new issues 
demand their attention (ibid, 152). In fact, Cross says that “in order to even have a 
legitimate voice at the table when a crisis strikes, an actor may have already had to 
establish itself beforehand as one to be listened to” (ibid.).  
However, even in conditions of certainty, epistemic communities may still be 
able to practice their influence. The emergence of new evidence/information, the 
reaching of consensus on previously contested knowledge, or the changing of 
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contextual factors may all be cause for epistemic communities to influence policy 
making on issues that are considered as certain. Because of this, Cross argues that a 
wider understanding of uncertainty is necessary in order to be able to consider the full 
extent of epistemic community activity in situations of uncertainty and even certainty 
(ibid, 153).  
Cross’s third innovation addresses the relationship between epistemic 
communities and governments. Cross states that a frequent critique of epistemic 
communities is that they “have little substantive influence over politics, particularly in 
the most important or basic areas of international relations decision-making” (ibid.). 
Cross refutes this critique by arguing that in fact, epistemic communities often work 
with governments in a plethora of ways. For instance, epistemic communities that 
work with international organizations will work and have contact with governments 
around the world (ibid.). Moreover, while maintaining autonomy, epistemic 
communities can often be located within governments themselves. Furthermore, 
governments may unwittingly, by calling on experts for advice, be the ones who bring 
together the experts that will go on to form an epistemic community. (ibid, 153.)  
When epistemic communities are working with/in governments, it can be 
difficult to tell them apart from a bureaucratic group. However, Cross in a couple of 
publications has recommended a few investigative questions that one can use to 
determine whether a group is an epistemic community or not:  
Is a particular committee more than the sum of its parts? Does it 
produce outcomes that go beyond the expectations of its formal 
functions? Did the committee’s members possess a high level of 
expertise before taking up their institutional positions? Did they 
perhaps even know each other or work with each other in previous 
settings? Might they, as a collective, wield influence by virtue of their 
expertise and high status even without the existence of the committee? 
Do they share training or educational experiences? Do its members 
meet often outside of work and informally? Do they share a particular 
culture and professional norms that are independent of their formal 
function? (Cross, 2011, 16; Cross, 2013, 154.) 
 
Cross says that not all these questions need to be answered in the affirmative 
to indicate an epistemic community (Cross, 2013, 154); however, it is clear that these 
questions do line up with Cross’s four variables of professionalism outlined above. 
Cross critically points out that “a group of experts may come together for many 
reasons, but it becomes an epistemic community at the initiative of its members” 
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(ibid.). Such epistemic communities will have no problem gaining access to decision 
makers, and therefore, their policy initiatives have a greater chance to be heard (ibid.). 
The fourth and final innovation presented by Cross is moving epistemic 
communities beyond scientific knowledge. Cross argues that the assumption that 
epistemic communities are exclusively “scientific or technical groups” is incorrect 
(ibid.). In fact, Cross states that members of non-scientific epistemic communities can 
claim authoritative knowledge just as any scientific epistemic communities. Non-
scientific epistemic communities even have the four characteristics of an epistemic 
community as defined by Haas. Cross’s belief is that “professionalism, rather than 
science, is the glue that holds epistemic communities together, facilitates consensus, 
and enables persuasion.” (ibid, 155.)  
To prove her argument, Cross then lays out three examples of effective 
epistemic communities based on professionalism, rather than science. In summary, 
these three epistemic communities included European generals and admirals, whose 
consensus has led to such policy innovations as the ‘Long-Term Vision for European 
Defense Capability and Capacity Needs’; diplomats, who may work together for 
greater outward results rather than their own specific national interests; and religious 
leaders, who use a shared interpretation of religious texts to mediate conflicts and 
social tensions (ibid, 155-158). A key aspect of these epistemic communities is that 
they, like their scientific counterparts, are not comprised of an entire profession, but 
rather are comprised of members of a profession with “shared professional norms and 
expertise … [and who] seek collective policy goals as a result of these qualities” (ibid, 
156). Therefore, the entire military structures of the European militaries do not 
comprise an epistemic community because many members lack the shared 
professional norms and expertise needed to be considered an epistemic community, 
rather just the highest level members of the militaries are able to form an epistemic 
community. In addition to this, the rank of the members of the epistemic communities 
in the three examples is significant. Their positions give “legitimacy, authority, and 
influence [to] their shared authoritative claim[s] to knowledge” (ibid, 158).  
However, Cross makes it clear that the knowledge that an epistemic 
community produces is not the most important reason for why an epistemic 
community’s ideas are chosen, but instead, the most important reason for the choosing 
of an epistemic community’s ideas is that the community’s knowledge is socially 
31 
 
recognized, even if the knowledge is unproven (ibid.). According to Cross, social 
recognition is at the base of an epistemic community’s influence (ibid.).  
 
3.5 Epistemic Communities in the Domestic Realm 
 
 While much of the literature on epistemic communities focuses on 
transnational and international communities, there does exist an argument that 
epistemic communities can exist on the domestic level as well. Looking at two, rather 
different, case studies, it is possible to see that epistemic communities do indeed have 
a place in domestic decision making. First, there is Craig W. Thomas’s (1997) paper 
on how epistemic communities can encourage interagency cooperation within the 
United States, and then there is Patrik Marier’s (2008) paper on how politicians can 
form epistemic communities.  
Thomas’s main goal in his paper is to discover why resource management 
agencies in the Pacific Northwest began to cooperate with each other at the highest 
levels (Thomas, 1997, 235-236). Throughout the paper, Thomas emphasized and 
explained how these agencies are more keen to maintain their autonomy rather than 
work with another agency which might compromise its own independence (ibid, 228-
229). However, when looking at the activity of the various agencies involved, Thomas 
noticed that the most active participants (whose agencies were not run by ecologists) 
were those that at the time had entered into a period of uncertainty. In 1991, a court 
decision halted logging operations by the Forest Service because of its violation of 
environmental laws. This in turn opened the eyes of others agencies to the need for 
their agencies to find a solution for protecting the environment in their jurisdictions. 
(ibid, 240-241.) As a result a council was formed in which the agencies worked out 
solutions for better cooperation in protecting the environment. This council created a 
platform for discussion at which solutions provided by an epistemic community of 
ecologists could be presented. (ibid, 238-239.)  
Thomas concluded that epistemic communities can be found at the domestic 
level. Though when applied to relations between public agencies, he states that Haas’s 
theory of international cooperation and policy coordination cannot be imported word 
for word (ibid, 242). Like Haas, however, Thomas believes that an epistemic 
community can only become effective after an initial shock or crisis forces public 
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officials to consider the knowledge-based authority of an epistemic community (ibid, 
243).  
Thomas’s study came close to broaching the idea that public officials 
themselves could form an epistemic community, however only a few of the heads of 
the agencies involved in his study could have been considered knowledge-based 
experts (ibid, 237-238). Patrik Marier’s paper, on the other hand, broaches this very 
topic at the root.  
Marier aims in his paper to show how politicians can come together to form an 
epistemic community. He uses an example of a parliamentary committee in Sweden 
from the 1990s, which was tasked with pension reform.  
Marier explains that politicians have a leg up on the scientific community 
when it comes to political knowledge. This is crucial if a policy project is to become 
law. However, he warns that not all politicians can be considered experts, and 
therefore, eligible to be included in an epistemic community: first, a politician is least 
likely to be considered an expert on a problem, if the problem is very technical; 
second, a politician must have relevant experience and knowledge in a policy area. 
(Marier, 2008, 518-519.) Marier identifies committees as the place where epistemic 
communities of politicians will likely grow because of the potential expertise of the 
politicians involved and their willingness to turn to experts (ibid, 520). In the end, 
Marier used Haas’s four characteristics of an epistemic community has a heuristic 
model to find out if the Swedish committee on pension reform constituted an 
epistemic community or not (ibid, 522). Through an analysis of the four 
characteristics, Marier showed how the committee of politicians had acted as an 
epistemic community and successfully created a politically viable pension reform plan 
(ibid, 529).  
Marier’s work showed how politicians can put aside their political viewpoints 
and instead use their expertise to gain consensus on policy projects. In the study of 
epistemic communities, this work gives strong proof of the role of politicians in 
epistemic communities. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
The study of epistemic communities is valuable for understanding the role that 
knowledge-based networks play in the fields of domestic, transnational, and 
33 
 
international politics. Although, it is most frequently applied to transnational and 
international politics, it still has applications at the domestic level.  
This section has attempted to inform the reader of the core theoretical design 
of the theory of epistemic community. The special edition of International 
Organization edited by Peter Haas is the seminal work on epistemic community 
theory. It is the foundation on which following publications on the theory have based 
their own research.  
However, with time, criticisms of the theory emerged and had to be addressed. 
Critics argued that Haas did not properly explain how epistemic communities work 
with or compete against other actors in the process of policy innovation. Nor did Haas 
address how, specifically, epistemic communities work with decision makers. The 
critics themselves offered suggestions on how the theory could be improved to make 
it clearer and more viable.  
Recently, in the early 2010’s, Mai’a K. Davis Cross published a couple of 
works that revisited the theory of epistemic communities. In her works, Cross showed 
how the theory of epistemic communities could be improved. She offered four new 
innovations to the theory that addressed both the criticisms of Haas’s work and her 
own perceptions of the shortcomings of the theory that had emerged over the twenty 
years between Haas’s edition of International Organization and her own works. 
While it is popular in International Relations to add the suffix neo- to theories which 
have evolved and changed over time (e.g. neoliberalism, neorealism), Cross’s works 
do not quite result in a neo-epistemic community theory. Rather, her works offered a 
revision of the theory, and therefore, her works have created what one can call a 
revised-epistemic community theory.  
However, all these major works seemed to avoid the domestic applications of 
epistemic community theory. Craig Thomas and Patrik Marier’s works were useful in 
showing how the theory can be applied in a domestic setting. Thomas’s work showed 
a more technical application of how the theory can be applied, while Marier’s showed 
how it can be applied in a political setting.  
When looking at an epistemic community of Finnish foreign policy experts, it 
is important to understand all the above literature. Haas’s work provides the 
foundation on which the whole theory stands. When analyzing a Finnish epistemic 
community, it is crucial to be able to identify Haas’s four characteristics of an 
epistemic community. These characteristics demonstrate whether an epistemic 
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community exists. However, Cross’s innovations create a continuum on which it is 
possible to understand how cohesive an epistemic community is and how strong or 
weak it may be. These core works on epistemic communities allow for a 
comprehensive understanding of what kind of epistemic community of Finnish 
foreign policy experts exists, and how it works.   
The aim of this thesis is to discover how an epistemic community of foreign 
policy experts has formed in Post-Cold War Finland. In particular it will explore how 
the epistemic community relates to the conflict in Ukraine, and analyze the response 
of this epistemic community to the conflict. How members of a foreign policy 
epistemic community narrate the Finnish model is important to this research. If the 
epistemic community is strong, then the narratives produced by its members should be 
more persuasive (according to Cross as mentioned in section 3.4). However, on the 
other hand, if the epistemic community is weak, then the narratives formed by the 
members have a smaller chance of being persuasive.  
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4. Methods and Data 
 
4.1 Narrative Analysis 
  
 In this thesis, the main method of analyzing data will be paradigmatic 
narrative analysis as presented by Donald E. Polkinghorne. Polkinghorne states that 
“narrative is the type of discourse composition that draws together diverse events, 
happenings, and actions of human lives into thematically unified goal-directed 
processes” (1995, 5).  Narrative descriptions, according to Polkinghorne, present 
human lives and their actions as a part of the many moving pieces that shape the 
world (ibid.).  
 Since this thesis will be using narrative analysis as a method, it is important to 
understand the method, and therefore one must understand what a narrative is in 
qualitative research. Polkinghorne defines narrative in qualitative research in two 
ways: narrative as prosaic discourse and narrative as story. A narrative in a prosaic 
discourse is “any text that consists of complete sentences linked into a coherent and 
integrated statement (ibid, 6).” This definition has been expanded to also include 
forms of natural discourse and speech. (ibid, 6.) The other definition, narrative as 
story, restricts narrative to the story discourse type. The story discourse type is unique 
because the individual actions and events in the narrative are pieced together by a 
plot. In other words, a story is an emplotted narrative, a narrative with a plot. (ibid, 
6.)   
 Furthermore, two types of reasoning can be used in the understanding of 
narratives. One is paradigmatic cognition, and the other is narrative cognition (ibid, 
9). Paradigmatic cognition is a form of knowledge that classifies (ibid.). A person will 
analyze something, in this case a narrative, and try to place it into a category. 
According to Polkinghorne, the categorization of things gives order to experiences, 
and this ability to give order to experiences is the essence of paradigmatic thought 
(ibid, 10).  Narrative cognition, on the other hand, is concerned with “understanding 
human action” (ibid, 11). Put simply, in order to understand human action, narrative 
cognition takes the events, actions, learnings of a person and/or a group of people and 
puts them into temporal context. By doing so, the events, actions, and learnings are 
turned into emplotted stories through which knowledge is found. (ibid, 11.)  
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 Using the two types of cognition, paradigmatic and narrative, Polkinghorne 
found two important types of narrative inquiry. He calls the form of narrative inquiry 
that uses paradigmatic cognition, analysis of narratives, and the form that uses 
narrative cognition, narrative analysis. (ibid, 12.) These forms of inquiry are quite 
similar to the cognitions themselves. Paradigmatic analysis of narratives is concerned 
with collecting narratives as data, and then analyzing the narratives looking for 
“common themes or conceptual manifestations (ibid, 13)...” Finding common themes 
or concepts can be done in two ways: one, by searching the data for previously 
theorized concepts; and two, “by developing the concepts from the data” itself (ibid, 
13). Narrative analysis is concerned with producing stories. The researcher must take 
the data points and configure them into a coherent plot. The result of such an 
emplotment is a story. Through this story, the researcher has created a retrospective 
explanation of events. (ibid, 15-16.)  
An example may be a helpful way of understanding these two different types 
of narrative inquiry. Erik Ringmar (2006) has written a quite detailed paper on 
narratives involved in the War in Iraq. Therefore, the Iraq War would make a good 
example for explaining the two types of narrative inquiry.  
In his paper, Ringmar analyzed the narratives that had formed around the War 
in Iraq. By analyzing the narratives, he was able to divide the various narratives into 
four types: romance, satire, tragedy, and comedy. Ringmar’s paper is an excellent 
example of paradigmatic narrative analysis (analysis of narratives). First, he took 
existing narratives as his data, and then he analyzed them. Upon completion of his 
analysis, Ringmar was able to divide his data into four categories. The categories were 
the four narrative types mentioned above. In this case, Ringmar was looking at 
categories previously theorized by the ancient Greeks and seeing how his data fit into 
those categories. (Ringmar, 2006.)  
Ringmar, however, was not limited to a paradigmatic narrative analysis. If, 
instead of collecting narratives as his data, he had located specific important events 
relating to the Iraq War, and then written about how these events culminated in the 
lead up to the war, then he would have been conducting a narrative analysis using 
narrative cognition.  
Another discussion of narrative analysis involves the question of how political 
narratives relate to political reality. Shaul R. Shenhav attempted to enlighten this field 
of research by describing how “narrative and narrative tools in the study of politics 
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can be based on a wide spectrum of assumptions… Understanding the role of the 
dynamic changes in these assumptions facilitates our understanding of the possible 
coexistence of different political narratives. (Shenhav, 2006, 246.)”  
Shenhav argued that narrative is the product of perspective; meaning that 
when one chooses to describe a particular event rather than another event, the 
described event is told from a viewpoint (ibid, 248). However, Shenhav asks how 
these narratives, when there can be so many, can accurately represent reality. He 
identifies two approaches that try to show how narrative represents reality: the first - 
that reality is chronologically ordered like a narrative is, and the second - that humans 
narrate reality in order to understand it (ibid, 249-250).  
These two approaches, according to Shenhav, rely on one’s values rather than 
methodology. “The decision hinges on whether one believes that certain narratives 
can be more ‘real’ … than others (ibid, 250).” Shenhav indicates four basic values for 
how one might view the relationship between narrative and reality.  
1. No representational ability: This view assumes that the narrative 
pattern with all its components cannot represent any aspect of 
“political reality.”  
2. Capacity for episodic representation: According to this view, narrative 
is potentially capable of representing discrete episodes and events, but 
not the chronological sequence or any uniformity suggested by it…   
3. Capacity for chronological representation: According to this view, the 
chronology of narratives can mirror sequences of events in “political 
reality,” but it cannot represent the causal relationships between them.  
4. Capacity for full representation: This view assumes that narratives are 
capable of fully representing a “political reality.” (ibid, 250-251.) 
 
Shenhav then analyzes how these basic views connect to his “three elements of 
narrative” (events, characters, and background; events in sequence; and causality) in 
narrative. He shows how the connection between these basic views and elements of 
narrative can be utilized by researchers with a diverse range of perspectives. (ibid, 
251-253.) 
In order to solve the question of how narratives represent political reality, 
Shenhav explains consensual paradigms. According to Shenhav, a “consensual 
paradigm of political reality [is] revealed when elements of discourse on a certain 
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subject become a recurring theme in a critical mass of political texts (ibid, 255).” 
Once these consensual paradigms are identified, they can be considered to be 
‘political reality.’ Thus these paradigms can be applied to related narratives to 
determine if they faithfully represent ‘political reality.’ (ibid, 255.)         
Shenhav’s approach to narrative analysis, although useful, is focused on 
determining how narratives represent reality, while this thesis hopes to analyze 
narratives for their content. Therefore, in the case of this thesis, Polkinghorne’s 
paradigmatic narrative analysis approach will be used. Narratives will be collected 
through interviews, after which the author of this thesis will analyze the narratives and 
sort them into categories. Similar to how Ringmar used previously theorized 
categorization of narrative types formed by the Greeks, the author of this thesis will 
use categories of narrative types formed by researchers of Cold War foreign policy. 
By categorizing the narratives, the author can then analyze the relationship between 
the different categories and the narratives contained within. For instance, it would be 
interesting to discover if one category of narrative is more favored by men than 
women or vice versa.  
 
4.2 Interviews 
 
The recent popularity of the Finnish model tends to come from foreign policy 
experts and researchers from abroad rather than Finland. One of the purposes of this 
thesis is to discover how Finnish foreign policy experts and researchers relate to the 
topic of the Finnish model, and how they narrate this particular topic. However, 
Research on Finnish foreign policy by Finnish experts and researchers is quite limited 
in the English Language, particularly concerning the Finnish model. Therefore, it was 
decided that the best way to extract these narratives was through interviews. By 
collecting interviews from Finnish foreign policy experts and researchers in Finland, 
this thesis can then use these interviews to discover the various narratives that may 
have appeared among the interviewees. Therefore, it is important to explain what 
interviews are and how the interviews were collected and conducted for use in this 
thesis. 
Interviewing is a method which utilizes conversations in order to ascertain the 
stories of a person’s life in their own words (Kvale, 2007, 1). More scientifically put, 
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the interaction between interviewer and interviewee constructs knowledge based on 
the interview (ibid.).  
Interviews all on their own can be a research method; however, the interview 
method can also be used in combination with other methods, such as narrative 
analysis (ibid, 6-7). Qualitative methods using linguistics, such as narrative analysis, 
have become quite important in “obtaining knowledge of the social world.” Given this 
and the fact that interviews can construct knowledge, it is clear that interviews as a 
research method should go hand and hand with qualitative research methods. (ibid, 
7.)     
One type of interview commonly used is the semi-structured interview. A 
semi-structured interview is something between an open conversation and a 
questionnaire. The semi-structured interview can even seem similar to a conversation, 
but the semi-structured interview has a purpose and technique by which the interview 
is conducted. (ibid, 11.) When conducting a semi-structured interview, the researcher 
should have a script, which at the least outlines the topics which will be discussed 
during the interview, and at the most contains a list of questions to be asked during the 
interview. Particularly in the latter case, while preparing the interview script, it is up 
to the researcher to decide how strictly he or she will stick to the questions in the 
script. (ibid, 56-57.)  
Finally, when one conducts an interview, one must always be aware of the 
ethical issues that might arise in the process. According to the “Ethical Principles of 
Research in the Humanities and Social and Behavioural Sciences and Proposals for 
Ethical Review” (2009, 3), the interviews in this thesis will not need to undergo any 
ethical review, because they do not meet the criteria laid out by the National Advisory 
Board on Research Ethics. The author also needs to make clear with each interviewee 
that the results of this interview may be published in the thesis, and therefore it is up 
to the interviewee whether they want to be cited using their real name or a pseudonym 
(ibid, 13). The author should also remember to remind the interviewee that the 
interviewee him/herself can at any time cut the interview short (ibid, 5-6). Although, 
this last condition may not be so relevant for the types of interviews that this research 
will conduct, it is however wise to observe it in any case, because the interviewee has 
the right to know it. Finally, it is important that the author represents the interviewees’ 
words as faithfully as possible when conducting the final analysis.  
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4.3 Data Collection 
 
 Narratives for this thesis were gathered by conducting interviews, for, as 
mentioned above, interviews are an excellent way of collecting narratives. The 
interviews were conducted with several Finnish foreign policy experts; from the 
University of Tampere in Tampere, Finland and Finnish Institute of International 
Affairs (FIIA) in Helsinki, Finland. In order to first decide who to interview, the 
author met with his academic supervisor at the University of Tampere. From this 
meeting, a list of around ten names was formed. The names that formed the list were 
chosen based off their relation to the research in this thesis. The researchers chosen 
were interested in the fields of Finnish foreign policy, Russian foreign policy, and/or 
Finnish political history. The author then composed and sent invitation emails to each 
person on the list. A couple never responded, and only one declined the invitation due 
to personal reasons, though he offered a couple of names to add to the list of possible 
interviewees. The rest of the invitations were accepted, and meetings were arranged. 
After this, the hope was that the interviews would snowball, meaning that one 
interviewee would recommend another person to also be interviewed, and so on; 
however, disappointingly this did not happen as expected, it is explained why below. 
In the end, eight interviews were collected and used for analysing narratives. In 
accordance with the wishes of a few of the interviewees, the anonymity of all of the 
interviewees will be preserved in this thesis. 
The interviews used in this thesis were conducted in a semi-structured way. 
Before meeting with the interviewees, the author wrote out a script that contained 
several questions. The questions were designed to elicit long, thoughtful responses. 
The author decided before conducting the interviews that he would try to stick to the 
script as closely as possible, but he recognized that follow up questions and questions 
of clarification would be hard to avoid, therefore, a degree of flexibility was allowed 
into the conducting of interviews. The interview was structured not unlike the funnel-
shaped interview described by Kvale (2007, 57). Similar to a funnel-shaped interview, 
the script structure for these interviews starts with broad questions and gradually 
winds down to the heart of the subject. Firstly, the interviews began by ascertaining 
the credentials and background information of the interviewees. This included such 
information as age, position, and previous research.  
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Next, the interview turned to the topic of epistemic communities. As 
mentioned in the section of this thesis on epistemic communities, epistemic 
community theory is the theory that knowledge based networks of experts form in 
various policy areas in order to influence policy making for the common good. One of 
the research questions of this thesis is what kind of an epistemic community of 
foreign policy experts formed in post-Cold War Finland. To this end, interviews have 
played a vital role. Because the author of this thesis does not speak Finnish, 
discovering the nature of any epistemic community in Finland would have been 
difficult, when only looking to written sources; therefore, interviews enabled the 
author to meet with Finnish foreign policy experts in person and pose questions to 
them that might reveal an epistemic community. From the interviews, the author was 
then able to assess the particular nature of the epistemic community (i.e. the strength 
or weakness of the community). 
This section of the interview was the most funnel-esque. Here a few questions 
were asked to determine the interviewees’ relative position in a possible epistemic 
community. These questions involved asking the interviewee about their activities as 
a researcher (i.e. participation in conferences and seminars), regularity of formal and 
informal discussions with colleagues, who their colleagues are (i.e. other researchers, 
politicians, etc.), and so on (see app., questions 2-4).  
After this, the next topic in the interview was the Finnish model. This was the 
most precise section, as what the interviewees said here became the author’s narrative 
data. This section included questions 5, 6, and 7 (see app.).  
Finally, in a final effort to get a sense of the cohesiveness of any epistemic 
community that might exist and in hopes of finding more interviewees, the author 
asked the interviewees how many people do they think agree/disagree with them, and 
who those people would be (see app., question 9).  
 
4.4 Issues and Concerns 
 
 Collecting the data was not without its problems and challenges. While 
conducting the interviews and after some reflection, three problems became clear.  
The first problem that became clear was that the order of the questions from 
the interview script were not ideal. After a few interviews it became clear that the 
author had to move one of the questions from the beginning of the interview to a time 
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later in the process. After tweaking the order a bit, the order of the questions became 
much smoother, and made the interviews decidedly easier. The final organization of 
the questions can be found in Appendix one at the end of this thesis.  
The second problem was more significant than the first. In this problem there 
were a few smaller ones. The question itself as written in the script is “How many do 
you think agree/disagree with you? Who are they?” (see app., question 9.) Upon 
reflection, it is clear that the question was quite vague. At first, the author asked the 
question as it was written in the script, but the responses were often completely 
unexpected and unrelated to what he thought he was asking. The author was hoping to 
elicit an answer about the interviewee’s overall opinion of the Finnish model and all 
the intrigue surrounding it, however, he found that sometimes the interviewees 
understood the question to be about the previous question (Given the current situation 
in Ukraine, how would you solve the conflict? [question 8] ). To resolve this, the 
author rephrased the question to ask instead how many people the interviewee thought 
would agree/disagree with their opinions and assessments of the Finnish model. This 
rephrasing of the question did mostly help clear up the problem, though not entirely. 
However, there was still another problem within this question: the second part of the 
question asking “Who are they?” The author felt that it was clear that he meant who 
exactly are they, but it was very clear by the results of the interviews that this was not 
clear at all. Because of this, the hopes of the author to find more interviewees through 
a process of snowballing were dashed.  
This led to the question of the third problem: was there a language barrier? 
This was not such a problem as it was a possible risk. The interviewees were all 
Finns, who spoke English as a second language. Before the interview, the researcher 
had no way of knowing at what level the interviewees spoke English. However, in the 
end each interviewee had an excellent command of the English language. So then this 
begs the question: why was the final question so difficult? The author concludes that 
most likely he had taken for granted what he knew he was asking in his head for what 
the interviewees understood.     
 
 
 
43 
 
5. Evaluating the Epistemic Community 
 
 After compiling the data from the interviews, the first thing that must be 
looked at is what kind of epistemic community exists. By “what kind of epistemic 
community exists”, this thesis means to ask where the epistemic community exists on 
a strong-weak continuum. In the theory chapter of this thesis, several understandings 
of what an epistemic community is were covered. Predominantly, chapter three 
focused on the theories of epistemic community as devised by Peter Haas and Mai’a 
K. Davis Cross. This thesis holds these two theoreticians’ works to be the seminal 
works on epistemic communities, and therefore, they will be used as the guides in 
helping this thesis determine the nature of this epistemic community. 
 As mentioned in the theory chapter, Haas’s four characteristics of an epistemic 
community are a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, shared causal beliefs, 
shared notions of validity, and a common policy enterprise.  
 Haas used these four characteristics to show whether an epistemic community 
did, or did not, exist. However, Haas put the greatest emphasis on the third 
characteristic, shared notions of validity (1992, 23). In contrast, Cross believes that 
shared causal beliefs and common policy enterprise are the most important (2011, 25). 
This is because Cross believes that internal cohesion and professionalism are at the 
core of an epistemic community’s ability to persuade (2013, 147).  
First, it must be recognized that Haas’s four characteristics of an epistemic 
community are the foundation for testing what comprises an epistemic community. 
Therefore, it would be wise to see if the data in this thesis shares Haas’s four 
characteristics.  
1. Shared set of normative and principled beliefs: The interviewees in this 
thesis were all Finns. As academics and Finns, it can be tenuously 
expected that they share normative and principled beliefs.  
2. Shared causal beliefs: From the interviews, during the discussion on 
Finnish Cold War foreign policy, it could be seen that the interviewees 
shared similar causal beliefs that allowed them to approach the subject 
of Finnish Cold War foreign policy in similar ways. Although this does 
not guarantee that they share causal beliefs on Finnish foreign policy in 
general, it is a good indicator. 
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3. Shared notions of validity: Though it is never explicitly stated in the 
data, the fact that the interviewees of this thesis were all academics 
means that it can be likely assumed that their notions of validity lie in 
the realm of peer-reviewed publications.  
4. Common policy enterprise: The interviewees in this thesis all have 
done research on the topic of the Finnish foreign policy. From the data 
it could be seen that each one has done research that has aimed to 
understand and explain Finnish foreign policy. Their participation in 
conferences, seminars, and government panels on the topic of Finnish 
foreign policy shows that they each have an interest in the betterment 
of Finnish foreign policy.  
From this it can be seen that the characteristics of an epistemic community 
exist amongst the interviewees; however, it is now important to look at how strong 
this epistemic community is. To do this, one should then turn to Cross’s four 
variables. These variables are important because they measure the cohesion and 
professionalism of an epistemic community; as mentioned above, cohesion and 
professionalism are important in understanding the effectiveness of an epistemic 
community. The four variables are selection and training, meeting frequency and 
quality, shared professional norms, and common culture. Each of these variables can 
be measured on a strong-weak continuum, and by understanding where this epistemic 
community lies on this continuum, the cohesiveness and professionalism of the 
epistemic community can be understood.  
Selection and training: From the data it appears that the members of this 
epistemic community were not competitively selected. Cross argued that the 
competitiveness of selection ensures that an epistemic community’s members are at a 
high level in their profession (Cross, 2013, 150). By this, competitively selected 
means that an epistemic community may have strict requirements for selecting its 
members, looking to accept those who are most capable and qualified rather than 
those who may not yet be considered experts. As regards this epistemic community, 
the interviewees were at different levels in their training. Some were doctoral 
students, and some were researchers with well-known names in Finnish foreign policy 
already. It appears that the epistemic community has formed with the minimum 
requirement for acceptance being an academic interest in Finnish foreign policy 
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matters. Judging this variable by ‘selection’ alone would render this epistemic 
community as weak; judging it by ‘training’ is a bit more complicated.  
Although doctoral students would not pose as likely candidates for the title of 
expert, oftentimes (and in the case of this data, always) they conduct their research 
with the guidance of and under the supervision of an expert. Therefore, judging by 
‘training’ alone, it may be said that this epistemic community could rank higher on the 
strong-weak continuum. Although the members of this epistemic community are 
highly trained, the fact that there is no rigorous selection criteria weakens the very 
cohesiveness of this community; therefore, this thesis would rank this variable as 
weak on the strong-weak continuum. 
Meeting frequency and quality: Of the four variables, ‘meeting frequency and 
quality’ is probably one of the easier variables to analyze. Meetings may consist of 
both formal gatherings (i.e. conferences and seminars) and informal gatherings (i.e. 
meetings at cafes and social dinners). From the data, it is clear that all of the 
interviewees regularly participated in formal gatherings on the topic of Finnish 
foreign policy with the exception of one. In the case of the exception, this researcher 
was more focused on matters of Russian foreign and security policy; however, the 
topic of how Russian foreign policy affects Finnish foreign policy has come up in 
formal discussions. Therefore, at least to a certain extent, it can be said that this 
researcher also has participated in formal discussions on Finnish foreign policy, 
though indirectly. Again, they all said that they regularly discuss Finnish foreign 
policy in informal settings rather frequently with one exception. In this case, the 
researcher stated that Finnish foreign policy was not a frequent topic in his/her place 
of work, so he/she was limited in his informal discussion of Finnish foreign policy. 
The quality of these meetings can of course vary. At formal gatherings, a high quality 
meeting would most likely consist of multiple experts with a high level of discussion 
on the topic of Finnish foreign policy. Because of the formality, one can assume that 
such meetings may not occur overly frequently. This may be because such meetings 
can typically happen only on an annual basis (such as conferences), or because expert 
points of view may not be in demand at any given time (such as with seminars). 
Informal gatherings can be harder to analyze. The primary reason for meeting may not 
have been to talk about Finnish foreign policy, but it occurred anyways, and in such a 
case, how does one measure the quality of such meetings? In the case of evaluating 
these meetings then, one might give a higher value to the quality of formal gatherings 
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over their frequency and a higher value to the frequency of informal gatherings over 
their quality. Consequently, this thesis would give this variable a strong rating. From 
the interviews it was determined that the quality of the formal gatherings by the 
interviewees was quite high and even, from a few, quite frequent. The informal 
meetings were very frequent, and some of the interviewees even expressed a strong 
interest in discussing Finnish foreign policy.           
Shared professional norms: The fact that all of the interviewees come from 
academia, it can be expected that they share professional norms. For instance, they 
share a notion of validity that allows them to have well-informed debates and 
discussions on topics of Finnish foreign policy. As a result, this variable would lie on 
the strong end of the continuum. 
Common culture: The ‘common culture’ variable is likely the strongest 
variable in this epistemic community. As has been said before, all of the interviewees 
were from Finland and were Finns. They share a national culture, identity and 
heritage; “Finland is a homogenous country, ethnically, culturally, also socially… 
(Interviewee B)”. Each was selected to be interviewed because of their work 
involving Finnish foreign policy. All in all they have “the sense of purpose, identity, 
symbolism, and heritage…” (2013, 150) which Cross attributes to ‘common culture’. 
Given this, this epistemic community’s ‘common culture’ would sit on the strong end 
of the continuum.    
 Looking at these variables, it is possible to conclude that this epistemic lies 
somewhere between medium and strong. That is what this analysis shows. However, 
this thesis would like to point out one problem from this analysis. That is that this 
analysis for all intents and purposes shows a relatively strong epistemic community 
on paper, but in reality it is not so clear if this epistemic community is truly cohesive, 
and therefore, strong. As mentioned in the Methods chapter, this thesis was unable to 
successfully use the final question of the interview to find more interviewees. Future 
research may be able to elicit more names from the interviewees and discover whether 
names begin to be repeated by the various interviewees. By doing so one could further 
understand how cohesive the epistemic community may be. However, for now, it is 
difficult to definitively argue that this epistemic community is strong.  
In conclusion, this thesis would argue that this epistemic community is a 
professional community, and if the interviewees are more tight-knit than could be 
determined by the interviews, then it could be classified as a strong, cohesive 
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community as well. However, more research should be done into this topic in order to 
determine more clearly what kind of epistemic community exists. This thesis hopes 
that the data given here can be used as a stepping stone to finding more conclusive 
results in the future. 
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6. Narrative Analysis of Finnish Foreign Policy 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The overall aim of this research was to discover how an epistemic community 
of foreign policy experts had formed in Post-Cold War Finland. In particular this 
thesis wanted to explore how the representatives of the epistemic community related 
to the conflict in Ukraine and analyze the response of these representatives to the 
conflict. This research wanted to discover if they worked in support of or against the 
idea of the Finnish Model, particularly by identifying the overarching narratives used 
by the representatives of the epistemic community. 
In the previous section of this thesis, data from the interviews were analyzed 
and it was concluded that a medium-strong epistemic community in Finnish foreign 
policy exists. The confirmation of the strength of the epistemic community allows the 
thesis to now proceed to the next step in the data analysis. That is, the thesis will now 
turn in this section to determining how the representatives of the epistemic 
community, who have been interviewed, narrate the Finnish model. First, the 
overarching narrative about the Finnish model will be determined, and from there the 
thesis will breakdown the slight differences in how the narratives were emplotted by 
the various interviewees: i.e. how they narrated the finer points of the model. Second, 
the thesis will analyze how the interviewees related to the Finnish model and how 
they see it as a solution for other countries in similar situations as Cold War Finland. 
 
6.2 Narrative on the Finnish model 
 
6.2.1 Overarching Narrative 
 
 The interviewees interviewed for this thesis represented different generations. 
The youngest participants were born after the end of the presidency of Kekkonen and 
around the end of the Cold War, and the oldest participants would have been born 
right around the beginning of the presidency of Paasikivi. Given this vast age range, it 
was expected that at least two overarching narratives would be found; however, an 
analysis of the data showed that amongst all eight interviewees, one overarching 
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narrative appeared. That narrative is this: The Finnish model was a successful 
endeavour that allowed Finland to stay out of a great power conflict while maintaining 
relations with both the East and the West.  
 To determine this narrative, the thesis analyzed the responses of the 
interviewees to questions 4-7 (questions relating to Finnish Cold War foreign policy; 
see app.) from the interviews. By analyzing how the eight interviewees emplotted 
their stories, the thesis was able to understand the overarching narrative that they were 
producing. For instance, several keywords/phrases and patterns appeared in the 
various interviewees’ stories that highlighted the plots.  
 The whole of the overarching narrative can be broken down into two parts: the 
first, the success of the Finnish model, and the second, the avoidance of great power 
conflict while maintaining relations with both the East and the West. When looking at 
how the interviewees emplot the first part of the narrative a few patterns appear. Not 
all of the interviewees agree on the recommendation of the Finnish model for other 
countries (more on this later), but even amongst those interviewees, a pattern 
appeared where the interviewees all said something along the lines of: Finland’s 
situation during the Cold War was unique and difficult, if not impossible, to recreate. 
Interviewee D, who was perhaps the most opposed to the Finnish model of all the 
interviewees, said, “The Finns … rather stress the particularity of Finland, and stress 
… universal applicability of certain international norms. … Thinking about other 
countries in Europe, in Russia's neighborhood, it's very difficult to build up and to 
maintain this kind of neutrality that Finland had.” Although, s/he doesn’t declare the 
Finnish model as an outright success, s/he implies that it worked for Finland, though it 
may not work for others. On the other side, some of the interviewees felt that the 
Finnish model was successful outright. Only Interviewee B said so in as many words, 
but Interviewee A also implied the model as a success,  
...Finnish model was example of peaceful coexistence… The idea was that … 
Finland takes into account the so-called legitimate security interests of the 
Soviet Union … in the neighborhood of Leningrad. Kekkonen argued that 
Finland’s neutrality is based on its willingness to pursue neutral policies. … 
That was the basic idea of the Finnish model: being part of the West, using the 
policy of neutrality as an active element for promoting useful ideas for the 
international community and interests that at the same time served Finland’s 
own security. I still regards it as valuable and useful.   
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The second part of the narrative, the avoidance of great power conflict while 
maintaining relations with both the East and the West, was defined by the use of 
several keywords by the interviewees. Five particularly strong keywords and phrases 
used or implied by the interviewees were: ‘peaceful coexistence’, ‘great power 
confrontations’, ‘peacekeeping’, ‘balancing act’ and ‘room for maneuver’. By 
analyzing the use of these keywords and phrases, the thesis was able to determine that 
a major part of the overarching narrative on the Finnish model was the importance of 
Finland being able to stay out of the Cold War (great power conflicts) and having 
room to maneuver (balancing act, room for maneuver). Interviewee D said that one 
plus of the Finnish model for Finland was that it was a “very idea of neutrality that 
you stay outside great power conflicts. Finland managed to use this neutrality actively 
also to make its own proposals and to take the initiative.” Interviewee B similarly 
stated in response to question 5 (‘How do you view the Finnish Cold War foreign 
policy?’; see app.) that “Military non-alignment is always a working solution to stay 
out of great power confrontations…  It's a good line of policy to pursue.” To question 
7 (‘What in your mind are the pluses and minuses of the [Finnish model]?’), s/he said,  
Finland could also develop on that basis, Finland could participate in 
European and Global affairs. So it was a success in terms of foreign policy. 
[Finland] sort of had a larger environment than [it] would have otherwise been 
in because [it] was in an advantageous position. It was something which gave 
[Finland] a unique position and a good profile internationally. It proved to be 
good for the sake of [Finnish] and European security.  
 
6.2.2 Categorization: Survival, Appeasement, Balance 
 
Although the interviewees share an overarching narrative, they don’t all share 
similar views to the Finnish model itself. Three main categories appeared when 
analyzing the interviewees’ narratives. These categories don’t imply that the 
interviewee’s find themselves at loggerheads with one another, simply these 
categories focus in on the differences that appeared in interviewees’ narratives. The 
three categories that appeared were: survival, appeasement, and balance. 
Though one might initially define survival as living through an extraordinarily 
difficult situation, the thesis would also add success to the definition. Surviving is 
succeeding. That is the idea of the first category. Interviewees A and B can both be 
placed in this category as they were the only two who narrated the Finnish model in 
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this particular way. Particular among them was the emphasis on the merits of the 
Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line.  
... The core idea of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line: To have good 
relations with neighbors. When Paasikivi was president his main focus was for 
Soviet-Finnish relations. After the war that was the main task, to try to build 
some confidence and restart some good relations, and so on. Kekkonen during 
his presidency had different priorities. He had to reopen the gates towards the 
West… The main idea for both [presidents] was that the Soviet Union can be a 
good neighbor in a way that Finland has to cultivate these good neighborly 
relations, which at the same time allows Finland to be a part of the West … 
The pluses [of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line] were that Finland, even during 
difficult times …, was able to maintain its own Line, and be part of the 
West… The Soviet leaders did not like this emphasis in Finland on neutrality, 
the [FCMA] should be the cornerstone of Finnish foreign policy… Finland 
strongly argued that, because Finland is pursuing a policy of neutrality it can 
play a useful and constructive role in the European affairs and the United 
Nations… (Interviewee A)  
I think [the policy] was quite successful in many ways. It has not been 
credited enough. It was what Finland could do in such a difficult situation. 
(Interviewee B) 
 
Both interviewees also emphasized the misunderstanding inherent in the term 
‘finlandization’. 
 
As goes to finlandization: Finland’s decision makers and most 
academic people didn't like that term at all, because it was invented in 
Germany as a kind of offense… It was introduced by some West German 
conservatives, columnists, politicians … against Ostpolitik. Ostpolitik in their 
perception was kind of an expression of weakness towards the Soviet Union. 
Finland is so weak … [it] has to be submissive to Soviet pressures… Now, 
more experts in Finland than elsewhere agree that Finland was finlandized… 
[Finland] under Soviet pressure had to make concessions even in its domestic 
internal policies… my feeling is that in the present Finnish debate, these 
examples [of domestic influence, censorship] are exaggerated, not as frequent 
or bad as was claimed. (Interviewee A) 
[Finlandization] was a tool used for internal policies within 
Germany… [finlandization] was an unhappy term and we should not use it. 
(Interviewee B)  
 
 Whereas the interviewees in the survival category focused on the successes of 
the Finnish model, the interviewees in the appeasement category focused on the 
appeasement of Russia and maintaining good neighborly relations. Interviewee C put 
it very bluntly when s/he said that “the aim is to keep Russia from coming [to 
Finland].” For the appeasers this was (and for some still is) the most crucial aspect of 
the Finnish model. Interviewee F argued that by building these relations with Russia 
Finland was able to create some form of trust and cooperation and positive 
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relationship. Moreover, Interviewee H, a researcher at the University of Tampere, 
argued that  
this more relaxed position for Finland during the late 1950’s created the room 
where the finlandization phenomenon could happen because there cannot be 
any finlandization if you have any room to appease. And you could argue that 
appeasement is something the small states cannot do, because they do not have 
the leverage to really appease [the great powers]. 
 
Although these two categories are separate, they were not free from some 
overlap. Interviewee A stated that good relations with the Soviet Union was a core 
principle of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line, but it was only a passing statement when 
defining the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line. On the other hand, Interviewee E argued as 
well that the maintaining of contact with Russia was a core thing for Finns. However, 
s/he differed from Interviewee A in that s/he stated that “in order to survive, the 
relations need to be managed”. Although, from what has been seen above from 
Interviewee A, Interviewee E’s ideas may not differ much from Interviewee A’s, the 
narrative is still slightly different, and therefore Interviewee E was categorized as 
appeasement rather than survival. 
Finally, there is the category of balance. When analyzing this category, the 
thesis was stuck between making it a subcategory of appeasement or an individual 
category all its own. In the end it was decided to make it a separate category. The key 
difference between this category and the category of appeasement is that the category 
of balance focuses on the balancing act that Finland played during the Cold War 
between the East and West. Both Interviewee D and Interviewee G argued that the 
Finnish model was a balancing act, “Finland was walking a very fine line in trying to 
have friendly relations with the Soviet Union but avoiding dependence, and then also 
using the possibilities that then opened up to build closer ties with Europe and with 
the West (Interviewee D).” For Interviewee G it was “trying to create your own space 
and living conditions for your trade, financial, military, political, security”.  
 
6.3 Finnish Model for Others 
 
 Each interview for this thesis was segmented into three parts. The first part 
sought to determine what kind of an epistemic community on Finnish foreign policy 
existed, and the second part was able to collect the interviewees’ narratives on the 
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Finnish model. The third and final part of the interviews aimed to collect the 
interviewees’ narratives on the applicability of the Finnish model for other countries 
in a similar situation as Cold War Finland. This section will analyze these narratives. 
The Finnish model has been made relevant again with the suggestion of 
‘finlandization’ for Ukraine by international foreign policy experts such as Zbigniew 
Brzezinski (Brzezinski, 2014). Therefore, the topic of ‘finlandization’ for Ukraine 
appeared as an excellent catalyst to understanding how the interviewees viewed the 
Finnish model as a model for others. However, it was discovered in the interviews 
that a few of the interviewees believed that the model was a satisfactory model for 
states in a similar situation to Finland, but they did not agree, either totally or 
partially, that it was a solution for Ukraine. Because of this, this section will take the 
opposite approach of the last section. In the last section, the overarching narrative was 
determined first and then broken down. This section will do the opposite by first 
categorizing the individual narratives presented by the interviewees, and then 
determining the overarching narrative(s). Finally the thesis will search for any 
patterns that exist among the various demographics of the interviewees to determine if 
there are any dividing lines that help shape the narratives.  
 
6.3.1 Categorization 
 
When categorizing the narratives in this section, it is important to remember 
that what is being asked is ‘would the interviewees or would they not recommend this 
model to other countries?’. Keeping that in mind, the two main categories would 
appear to be ‘for’ and ‘against’. When viewing these two categories, it is important to 
remember that nothing is ever black and white. Some of the interviewees may have 
been generally for recommending the Finnish model to other countries in similar 
situations, but when confronted with examples (such as Ukraine), they would argue 
that the situation in the example country does not fit that of Finland’s situation well 
enough. Therefore, it would be good to subdivide the ‘for’ category into the 
subcategories of ‘totally’ and ‘hypothetically’. 
It is best to first look at the ‘against’ category. The author was able to place 
three interviewees in this category: interviewees C, D, and E. Interviewees C and D 
both clearly rejected the recommending of the Finnish model to other countries.  
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I wouldn’t recommend [it]. In a way I like the idea of trying to be 
neutral and play the mediator between big states, not being a member of 
military organizations. There were cases when being nonaligned was helpful 
for [Finland]... But the need and room for traditional peacekeeping there isn't 
that much anymore [sic]... Tools for nonalignment are decreasing in politics. 
(Interviewee C).  
 
Interviewee D agreed with Interviewee C’s general idea that the times have changed,  
No, I don't see it as an ideal solution. Thinking about other countries in 
Europe, in Russia's neighborhood, it's very difficult to build up and to maintain 
this kind of neutrality that Finland had. That's why actually most small states 
in Europe have chosen integration as their basic foreign policy strategy and 
not neutrality. Neutrality has almost disappeared. You can't call EU member 
states neutral, so you have Switzerland left basically. The calculation of the 
small countries has been that they can secure their security and their 
sovereignty better by integrating with the European and Western 
organizations. And it also has to do with Globalization. 
 
Interviewee E, unlike the other two, was less clear. In response to question 6 
(Is it a satisfactory policy for a state in a similar situation to Finland?), Interviewee E 
said, “At least it’s not a model for Ukraine.” However, Interviewee E’s answers to 
later questions reveal a bit more about how s/he views the Finnish model: “... I do not 
know if it was because of the model, or just a lucky chance that [Finland] survived 
(question 7). … No, the model wouldn't even work for Finland today probably. The 
system in Russia has changed so much [since Soviet times] (question 8ai).” Although, 
this thesis cannot make the assumption that Interviewee E is totally opposed to the 
model for every country in a similar situation to Finland (for instance, countries 
caught between two power blocs excluding Russia), it can draw the conclusion from 
these answers that Interviewee E is certainly skeptical about the Finnish model being 
applied today. Therefore, Interviewee E can be put in the ‘against’ category with 
Interviewees C and D.  
Whereas those in the ‘against’ category seemed rather sure of their answers, 
those in the ‘for’ category were not as clear. As mentioned above, it was decided that 
it was best to subdivide the ‘for’ category into the ‘for-totally’ subdivision and the 
‘for-hypothetically’ subdivision.  
It must be admitted that the word ‘hypothetically’ is misleading. At no point 
do the interviewees in this subdivision ever say that they are for the Finnish model in 
a hypothetical sense. Rather, both interviewees A and B, the two ‘for-hypothetically’ 
interviewees, said yes when asked if the Finnish model was a satisfactory policy for a 
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state in a similar situation to Finland. The reason this subdivision was created was 
because, even though they believe it is a satisfactory policy for a state in a similar 
situation to Finland, the interviewees did not believe it was an option for Ukraine and 
neither answered question 8aiii on whether there are any other states they would 
recommend it to. Of course, perhaps they do not believe there is another state that 
would fit the bill so to say at this given time in history. In any case, the thesis named 
this subdivision because of the interviewees’ support of the Finnish model for others, 
but a lack of examples for whom it might work. “Yes, it depends on the context of 
course. As a peace researcher I would recommend a line of policy which doesn’t 
increase confrontations, and doesn't invite more military persons in your 
neighborhood… In most situations. (Interviewee B)” 
The ‘for-totally’ subdivision also is named in a misleading way. Simply put, 
this subdivision was named as such in order to contrast it to the ‘for-hypothetical’ 
subdivision. Interviewees F and G, whom the author has concluded belong in this 
category, both said yes when asked if the Finnish model was a satisfactory one for 
others, just as Interviewees A and B. However, Interviewees F and G vary from A and 
B by their more ‘optimistic’ points of view for Ukraine. By this I mean that instead of 
highlighting the difference between Ukraine today and Cold War Finland as 
Interviewees A and B did, Interviewees F and G argued that there were aspects of the 
Finnish model that Ukraine could utilize for itself. “To the extent that Ukraine would 
be neutral and accommodate some of the key interests that Russia has, and perhaps 
have some sort of self-censorship… That might be helpful in terms of solving parts of 
the crisis. (Interviewee F)” “There has been the kind of similar situation that Cold 
War Finland probably had, that it has tried to build up relations to different directions. 
(Interviewee G)” Although Interviewees F and G were more optimistic about the 
possibilities of the Finnish model for Ukraine, they still came back to the same 
conclusions that Interviewees A and B made: Ukraine is completely different from 
Finland.  
Therefore, two things are clear: 1.) The two subdivisions of the ‘for’ category 
are not independent categories, and 2.) none of the interviewees, A-G, argued totally 
for the Finnish model. However, interviewee H, who has not been discussed thus far 
in this section, played the wildcard role. Interviewee H did not answer whether s/he 
though the Finnish model was a satisfactory one for others during the interview, and 
therefore, this thesis could not place him/her as either ‘for’ or ‘against’. However, 
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Interviewee H did provide some very useful answers to questions about the Finnish 
model as a solution for Ukraine and other countries.  
When asked if the Finnish model would be a solution for Ukraine, Interviewee 
H argued that  
No, the Finnish model cannot be a solution (for Ukraine) … The Finnish 
model isn't really something that you can apply to Ukraine. It has to be 
something different. finlandization might be an ideal type that tries to 
somehow explain the overall process of adaptation towards really tricky 
situations you have, and trying to manage asymmetric power relations from 
the perspective of the great power order. 
 
However, when asked if a kind of Finnish model 2.0 could be applied to Ukraine, like 
Interviewees F and G, Interviewee H found some ways in which Ukraine could follow 
the model:  
In that sense [of managing an asymmetric relationship], yeah. Try to find some 
general aspects… Finland was kind of a really unique phenomenon… Some 
lessons that might be applicable. For example, you have to do quite a lot of 
work as a small state to create even a small amount of latitude within these 
contexts. You might need to do some two-faced political moves. You can't 
only have good relations between the states leaders, but also you have to 
create some kind of initiatives, at the lower diplomatic levels, that constantly 
creates the ties towards the West.  
 
Furthermore, in response to a question of whether the Finnish model could be a model 
for some other country, Interviewee H offered Armenia as a possible state that could 
take the Finnish model.  
Somehow you can see it in Armenian foreign policy. They have tried 
to keep good relations with Russia, within a region that with many other states 
who have taken a rather contrasting stance towards Russia. At the same time 
they have tried to keep an open dialogue with the European Union. 
(Interviewee H) 
 
Likely, based off his/her answers, Interviewee H could also be included in the 
‘for’ category. Although his/her answers might seem like they would place him/her in 
the ‘for-totally’ subdivision, this thesis would rather put Interviewee H in the ‘for-
hypothetically’ subdivision, simply because Interviewee H never answered whether 
the Finnish model is a satisfactory policy for others or not. Later, Interviewee H 
approaches the idea of the Finnish model for Ukraine in a very hypothetical sense, and 
when discussing Armenia, s/he answers the question from the point of view of an 
observer rather than a commenter. 
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6.3.2 Narratives 
 
 The narratives that appeared when looking at the third section of the 
interviews (questions 6-8aiii) seem to be identical to the categories themselves. The 
author found that when looking at the data from the two categories two narratives 
emerged: 
1. The Finnish model is a satisfactory policy for a state in a similar situation to 
Finland, 
2. The Finnish model is not a satisfactory policy for a state in a similar situation 
to Finland. 
Narrative 1 clearly lines up with the ‘for’ category, and narrative 2 - with the ‘against’ 
category. These narratives are important because they help one understand how the 
representatives of the epistemic community relate to the Finnish model today, and 
how they see the model as an international solution.  
The first narrative includes both subdivisions of the ‘for’ category: 
Interviewees A, B, F, G, and possibly H. These interviewees, to greater or lesser 
degrees, agreed with the idea that the Finnish model would be suitable for other 
countries.  
The second narrative includes those represented in the ‘against’ category: 
Interviewees C, D, and E. These three interviewees agreed that the Finnish model was 
not suitable for other countries.  
 
6.3.3 Ukraine 
 
 As mentioned above, Ukraine was used as a catalyst to understand how the 
interviewees viewed the Finnish model given a specific, topical example. Section 
6.3.1 in many ways has already shown how the interviewees narrate the Finnish 
model as a solution for Ukraine (particularly the ‘for’ category); however, some 
nuances remain.  
 To begin with, the interviewees in the ‘against’ category, who shared narrative 
2 (above), each offered slightly different narratives to oppose the Finnish model for 
Ukraine. Interviewee C, similar to Interviewees A, B, F, and G, argued that Ukraine is 
a “different geographical, cultural, historical case. (Interviewee C)”  
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Interviewee D on the other hand, who was one of the most opposed to the idea 
of the Finnish model overall, argued that integration with the West would be the best 
solution for Ukraine. S/he stated that if one wants to use the Finnish model for 
Ukraine, then  
The model of Finland as Finland is today would be a model. Finland is in the 
EU but not in NATO. But I do not think that’s acceptable for Russia. … And, 
of course, there are many problems with this model, Ukraine is not ready for 
EU membership, and the EU is not willing to enlarge… That in theory might 
look like a good solution for everyone, to have this Ukrainian position similar 
to Finland in the sense of combining European integration with good 
relationship [sic] to Russia. So in that sense I could see it as a model, and 
maybe in a longer term perspective. But not the Finnish model from the Cold 
War era. (Interviewee D)  
 
As mentioned earlier, Interviewee E does not believe that the Finnish model is 
“a model for Ukraine.” S/he argues that the Russian system is entirely different from 
the Soviet one, and therefore, even Finland would not be able to follow its own Cold 
War foreign policy. Worse yet, “the Russian system is inside the Ukraine’s political 
system. (Interviewee E)” 
For each of these interviewees the individual narratives arguing against the 
Finnish model for Ukraine were different, but the overarching narrative was the same: 
The Finnish model is not a solution for Ukraine. 
In the case of the rest of the interviewees, it is good to break them down by 
their subdivisions: ‘for-totally’ and ‘for-hypothetically’. Although much has already 
been said about how the ‘for’ category interviewees narrated the Finnish model as it 
relates to Ukraine in section 6.3.1, it is still important to look at how they specifically 
narrate the Finnish model as it relates to Ukraine.  
The ‘for-hypothetically’ interviewees, A and B, were quite clear in their 
opposition to the Finnish model for Ukraine. Interviewee B particularly opposed the 
notion, saying, “The background is different; the situation is different.” S/he 
emphasizes the homogeneity of Finland versus the sharp diversity of Ukraine. 
Interviewee A similarly argues that the heterogeneity of Ukrainian society makes it 
too different from Finland. Instead of the Finnish model (model, a word that both 
interviewees A and B did not like, both preferring terms such as approach, line, 
solution), Interviewee A rather recommended the Åland approach, the idea that a 
country should take the interests of even small minorities into account.  
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It is not only in recent two or three years that this cleavage between east and 
west Ukraine has taken place. Eastern Ukrainians, the rebels, and Russia 
supporting them are right in their view that Eastern Ukraine should have some 
kind of special position or federal solution. But that is definitely up to Ukraine 
and the Ukrainians to decide… Ukraine, the government, is right in its 
approach to the European Union that it wants to develop its cooperation with 
the West, and at the same time it should take the views of the East Ukrainians 
which may differ from those of West Ukrainian [sic] and Kiev in a just way… 
(Interviewee A) 
 
The interviewees in the ‘for-totally’ subdivision differed from the ‘for-
hypothetically’ subdivision, again as mentioned above, only slightly. Both 
interviewees, F and G, reached the same conclusion about Ukraine as Interviewees A 
and B: that the situation in Ukraine is different from that of Cold War Finland. 
However, the difference between the two subdivisions lies in the idea that 
Interviewees F and G believe to some extent that Ukraine could adopt the Finnish 
model for itself. “To the extent that Ukraine would be neutral and accommodate some 
of the key interests that Russia has, and perhaps have some sort of self-censorship. 
That might be helpful in terms of solving parts of the crisis. (Interviewee F)” 
Interviewee G sees the Finnish model for Ukraine as a much more complex process 
than it was for Finland, 
...[for] the country to keep united would require a very open, serious public 
discussion on the social relations, political relations, economic relations… The 
social, political divisions [in Ukraine today] are a lot deeper than they were in 
Cold War Finland… It is a lot more complex [for Ukraine].  
  
Interviewee H also lined up quite strongly with the ‘for-hypothetically’ 
interviewees. However, this thesis will not go into Interviewee H’s views on Ukraine, 
since it has already covered them in section 6.3.1. 
Additionally, Question 8aiii asked the interviewees whether they saw the 
Finnish model as a model for any other countries besides Ukraine in hopes that the 
interviewees who narrated for the Finnish model would give more examples of places 
they thought the Finnish model might apply. Unfortunately, many of the interviewees 
were not able to or simply did not want to answer this question. Taiwan was brought 
up as an example, as mentioned earlier in this thesis, but many, most, said that they 
did not have enough knowledge of the situation in Taiwan to give an informed 
opinion. Interviewee C gave a noncommittal response when asked about Taiwan 
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saying, “Might be. Being a neutral country, if you truly manage to [be neutral]. [For 
Taiwan], it might be a worthy goal, but a difficult one.” 
The only interviewee who did offer an example was Interviewee H. He 
commented on research that offered Armenia as a possible country that could adapt 
the Finnish model for its purposes. As mentioned in section 6.3.1, Interviewee H sees 
the Finnish model, at least partially, in Armenian foreign policy, but s/he sees the 
Finnish model occurring slightly differently in Armenia from Finland. “The idea is 
maybe different from finlandization that finlandization in many ways was based on 
this really forced process…, but in this Armenian case it is suggested as a kind of 
policy that you can just implement into action without the tensions around. But there 
is this analogical connection. (Interviewee H)”  
 
6.4 Conclusion 
 
 When looking at the results of the data it is easy to see that two narratives 
persist: 1.) The Finnish model worked for Finland, and 2.) The Finnish model is 
unlikely to work for any country at the present.  
 The representatives of the epistemic community showed a certain “macro” 
consensus in how they narrated the Finnish model. In the first place, the overarching 
narration of the Finnish model was held by all of the interviewees. In the second 
place, although the interviewees answered question 6 in very different ways, the 
overall consensus was that the Finnish model would not likely be suitable for any 
existing countries. 
 Finally when looking at the data to see if any demographic patterns emerged, 
this thesis found that when narrating the Finnish model in section 6.2, the 
representatives of the epistemic community could possibly split by age. The older 
interviewees could be categorized differently from the younger ones when narrating 
the Finnish model (this thesis will not identify which categories they belong to, so as 
to protect their anonymity). Additionally, this thesis did not find any evidence that 
gender played any distinctive role in determining how the interviewees narrated the 
Finnish model.  
 This thesis also looked for demographic patterns that may have emerged 
amongst the interviewees when they were narrating the Finnish model for others in 
section 6.3. Unlike the demographic situation in 6.2, section 6.3 had a much murkier 
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picture. The interviewees shared no obvious demographic patterns with their 
respective narratives and categories. Just as in section 6.2, age may play a role in how 
Finns narrate the Finnish model as a solution for others; however, in this section it 
could not be said conclusively that age was a factor. Gender as well seemed to play no 
obvious role. This thesis would argue that further interviews with additional 
interviewees may reveal hidden demographic patterns. This thesis would recommend 
looking into the possibility that geography could be a factor, though, it could still yet 
be something completely different.   
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7. Conclusions 
 
This thesis aimed to discover what kind of an epistemic community of foreign policy 
experts had formed in post-Cold War Finland. Having determined this, the thesis then 
examined how the representatives of this epistemic community interviewed for this 
thesis narrated the Finnish model and its applicability to states in a similar situation to 
Cold War Finland. 
 The thesis found that a possibly strong epistemic community of Finnish 
foreign policy experts had formed in post-Cold War Finland. The representatives of 
this epistemic community all shared Haas’s four characteristics: a shared set of 
normative and principled beliefs, shared causal beliefs, shared notions of validity, and 
common policy enterprise. Moreover, when analyzing the strength of the epistemic 
community against Cross’s four variables, the results showed that the epistemic 
community existed somewhere between the medium-strong area of Cross’s weak-
strong continuum. However, the thesis concluded that it was difficult to determine 
how strong the epistemic community actually was due to difficulties in obtaining 
certain answers in the interviews.  
The next step in this thesis was to determine how the representatives of the 
epistemic community narrated the Finnish model, the Finnish model being the Finnish 
foreign policy during the Cold War. From the interviews, it was determined that one 
overarching narrative had developed amongst the interviewees: The Finnish model 
was a successful endeavour that allowed Finland to stay out of a great power conflict 
while maintaining relations with both the East and the West. Although a singular 
overarching narrative appeared, the thesis found that the interviewees could be 
categorized into three main categories, depending on what aspects of the narrative 
they particularly emphasized. These categories were survival, appeasement, and 
balance. Even though the interviewees differed slightly on how they perceived the 
Finnish model, the overall narrative remained true.  
Differences began to emerge between the representatives of the epistemic 
community when their responses on whether or not they would recommend the 
Finnish model to other countries were analyzed. The representatives of the epistemic 
community were almost evenly split when it came to recommending the Finnish 
model to others. For those who were ‘for’ recommending, there was a further split 
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between those who recommend it ‘totally’ and those who recommended it 
‘hypothetically’. The ‘for-hypothetically’ representatives of the epistemic community 
both believed that the Finnish model would be a good solution for other countries; 
however, they unequivocally argued against it for Ukraine, and they did not present 
any other existing countries that might be able to benefit from the Finnish model. The 
‘for-totally’ representatives differed from the ‘for-hypothetically’ representatives only 
in that they saw some potential for Ukraine to adapt certain aspects of the Finnish 
model. In the end the ‘for’ category representatives shared a simple common 
narrative: The Finnish model is a satisfactory policy for a state in a similar situation to 
Finland. 
Those in the ‘against’ category clearly disagreed with those in the ‘for’ 
category. The ‘against’ representatives did not believe that the Finnish model would 
be a suitable model for another country. Although, they did not appear to show 
consensus in their reasons for disagreeing with the idea of the Finnish model being a 
suitable model for Ukraine, they also shared a simple common narrative: The Finnish 
model is not a satisfactory policy for a state in a similar situation to Finland.  
Surprisingly, even though the representatives of the epistemic community 
diverged in their views on recommending the Finnish model, a consensus did seem to 
emerge, albeit unintentionally, that the Finnish model would not likely be suitable for 
any existing countries.  
The broad conclusions of this thesis show three things. First, a strong 
epistemic community of Finnish foreign policy experts exists in Finland. This 
epistemic community has the potential to be very professional, strong and cohesive, 
and to discover if the epistemic community reaches its full potential, more research 
will need to be done. Second, the representatives of this epistemic community, 
interviewed for this thesis, have found consensus in how they narrate the Finnish 
model. Across the various demographics of the representatives, the narrative 
regarding the Finnish model held. Third, the representatives of the epistemic 
community diverge on whether or not they would recommend the Finnish model to 
others, but from the data, it appears that it is unlikely that they would find any existing 
countries for whom they would recommend the model, particularly countries that find 
themselves between Europe and Russia.  
This thesis has created a foundation for future researchers interested in Finnish 
Cold War foreign policy to dive into the subject. It would be highly recommended for 
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someone to take this research and to expand on it; particularly to discover how strong 
and cohesive this epistemic community is in practice, and to delve deeper into the 
topic of the Finnish model.  
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Appendix 
1. Could I get some general information from you? What is your age, position, 
etc.? 
2. Do you currently or have you ever participated in any kind of event formal or 
informal, at which the topic of discussion was Finnish foreign policy? 
a. When? 
b. In what kind of environment do or did the events take place? e.g. an 
academic conference, a collection of published works, government 
advisory meeting, informal discussions. 
c. How frequently do or did such events take place? 
3. (If they participated in any such events) Who do or did you most frequently 
participate with in these events? 
a. What fields do your colleagues tend to work in? Are they all 
academics, or are some experts in other fields? i.e. government 
employees, politicians. 
4. It seems to me that Finnish model is quite topical right now internationally. 
What do you think about that? 
5. How do you view the Finnish Cold War foreign policy? 
a. How would you define the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line, finlandization, 
neutrality? 
6. Is it a satisfactory policy for a state in a similar situation to Finland? 
7. What, in your opinion, are the pluses and minuses of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen 
Line, finlandization, neutrality? 
8. Given the current situation in Ukraine, how would you solve the conflict? 
a. Would the Finnish model be a solution? 
i. Would you recommend that Ukraine follow the Finnish model 
as closely as possible to the model that Finland created, or 
would you recommend, let’s say, a Finnish model 2.0? 
ii. How would a Finnish model 2.0 look in Ukraine? 
iii. Do you see it as a solution for any other states faced with 
different situations? 
9. How many do you think agree/disagree with you? Who are they? 
